Enduring strength of Maoists
Members of Naxalites, officially the Communist Party of India (Maoist) that takes its name from Naxalbari, a village outside Calcutta where the revolt began in 1967, raise their arms during an exercise at a temporary base. (AP Photo)
In quick succession, three disruptive incidents have shocked India out of the complacency that had set in, as the policy establishment celebrated sharp declines in violence and fatalities engineered by the Communist Party of India – Maoist (CPI-Maoist), over the past year.
The worst of these incidents was, of course, the March 27, 2012, improvised explosive device (IED) attack on a Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) transport at Pustola in Gadchiroli District, Maharashtra, which killed 12 and injured 28. In their enthusiasm during CRPF Director General Vijay Kumar’s visit to Fulbodi Gatta to inspect a Community Outreach Programme, the troopers had ignored standard operating procedures (SOPs), driving over a road that had not been sanitized in advance. The Maoists were quick to take bloody advantage.
A loss of lives among SF personnel, however, is easily ignored and quickly forgotten by the Indian state. The abduction of foreigners and the inevitable international media carnival that follows, tends to be far more embarrassing, for much longer, especially when the ‘hostage drama’ extends over weeks. The ‘arrest’ as the Maoists chose to describe it, of two Italians – a tourist and a tour operator – on March 14, 2012, in the Daringbadi Block of Kandhamal District, Odisha, has, consequently, shattered the illusion of an ‘improved internal security situation’ to a far greater extent. While one of the hostages, Claudio Colangelo, was released on March 25, 2012, the second, tour operator Paulo Basusco, continues to be held hostage by the rebels at the time of writing. The abduction occurred while the Italians were moving in areas of Maoist influence, officials claim, against the advice of the administration.
Even as the Italian hostage drama was being played out, a Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA), tribal leader Jhina Hikaka, from the ruling Biju Janata Dal (BJD), was abducted on March 24, 2012, near Laxmipur in Koraput District, Odisha, when he chose to ignore security procedures, to travel through Maoist dominated territories from Semilguda to his constituency, Laxmipur. Hikaka’s vehicle was stopped near Toyaput, and he was abducted after he identified himself.
The Basusco and Hikaka abductions remain unresolved at the time of writing.
Crucially, all three actions were incidents of opportunity, reflecting enduring Maoist capacities, rather than strategic intent or planning, and demonstrating quite clearly that a decline in fatalities is not synonymous with a decline in rebel capacities or with an improvement in the ‘security situation’. Indeed, despite the significant reverses inflicted on the Maoists, especially at the leadership level, as well as some contraction in their areas of operation, the rebels’ disruptive capabilities in their core areas along the purported ‘Red Corridor’, remain substantially intact.
Despite many claims of the cumulative ‘improvement’ in the capacities of central and State Security Forces (SFs), the state’s vulnerabilities remain largely unaddressed. At least some claims of such ‘improvement’ are, in any event, largely falsified or fabricated – including the Union Ministry of Home Affairs’ (UMHA) November 30, 2011, claim that the police-population ratio had been raised to 176 per 100,000, from an National Crime Records Bureau figure of 133 per 100,000 as on December 31, 2010. Others, such as UMHA’s claims of “significant measures taken to strengthen the Indian Police Service” (IPS) remain something of a smokescreen, since existing deficits in the Service will take decades to fill, even with dramatically accelerated intakes. UMHA also claims that “Number of CAPF (Central Armed Police Force) battalions deployed in LWE (Left Wing Extremist) affected States increased from 37 in 2008 to 73 in November 2011, glossing over the fact that this has roughly been the level of deployment since the disastrous ‘massive and coordinated operations’ were launched by the Centre in end-2009. That these Forces have, along with State Police Special Forces, largely been frozen in a passive defensive posture since the Chintalnad massacre of April 2010, and that offensive operations against the Maoist have now become more and more the exception among demoralized SF contingents, remains unsaid.
On the other hand, the anecdotal evidence of state vulnerabilities and disarray is mounting. In one devastating disclosure, the UMHA conceded that as many as 46,000 officers and personnel took voluntary retirement from the CAPF between 2007 and September 2011, while another 5,220 officers and personnel resigned from service over the same period. 461 suicides and 64 instances of fratricides were also recorded. Worse, UMHA noted that the rate of increase of cases of resignation in the CRPF and Border Security Force (BSF) was “alarming”, at more than 70 per cent in 2011, over 2010.
If this dry data was not sufficiently disconcerting, Rahul Sharma, an IPS officer, serving as a Superintendent of Police in the Maoist afflicted Bilaspur District, in the country’s worst affected State, Chhattisgarh, committed suicide on March 12, 2012, blaming his seniors and the political leadership for his decision. Sharma had reportedly confided in a friend that he was frustrated because Police officers were required to do what he called ‘forced labour’ (begaar), and ‘extortion’ (ugahi) and that ‘targets for election expenses’ for the scheduled 2013 Assembly Elections had ‘already been set’. This incident provides extraordinary insight into the use and morale of the Police leadership in the State worst affected by the Maoist insurgency.
Nor is Chhattisgarh an exception. In the wake of the March 27 incident in Gadchiroli, Maharashtra Home Minister R.R. Patil complained that Police officers were ‘unwilling’ to work in the Maoist afflicted Gadchiroli and Chandrapur Districts, citing the recent example of four Police Sub-inspectors, who resigned from the Force after completing training, when they were posted to Gadchiroli. Patil had nothing but a litany of complaints to offer after the Gadchiroli incident, blaming the Centre for a failure to give advance information of Maoist attacks. Unsurprisingly, Maharashtra saw an increase in Maoist related fatalities to 69 in 2011, over the 2010 figure of 40, even as the all-India fatalities almost halved (from 1180 to 602).
The other principal Maoist affected States, Odisha, Jharkhand, West Bengal and Bihar suffer from equal and endemic deficiencies in their security structures, as well as from both ambivalence and infirmity in their political leaderships.
In another shock to the system, and testimony to the incompetence and incapacity of the state establishment, Kobad Ghandy, a CPI-Maoist Politburo member and top party ideologue, was discharged by a Sessions Court for offences under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), due to procedural defects in the prosecution. Ghandy was a prize catch, trapped in Delhi on September 20, 2009, after a protracted operation led by the Andhra Pradesh Special Intelligence Branch, and involving the Intelligence Bureau and Delhi Police. The Sessions Judge, Pawan Kumar Jain, observed,
I am of the considered opinion that there is sufficient material on record to make out a prima facie case for the offence punishable under Sections 20 and 38 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act against accused Kobad Ghandy. But since the cognisance order dated February 19, 2010, qua the offences punishable under the UAPA was not in accordance with the mandatory provisions of Section 45(2) of the UAPA, I hereby discharge accused Kobad Ghandy for the offences punishable under Section 10/13/18/20/38 of the UAPA. Similarly, I also discharge accused Rajinder Kumar for the offences punishable under Section 10/13/18/19/20 UAPA. However, there is sufficient material on record to make out a prima facie case against both the accused for the offences punishable under Section 419/420/468/474/120B Indian Penal Code.
Some augmentation of capacities – recruitment, arming, fortification and modernization – has, no doubt, occurred across the board, both in CAPF and State Forces, but this has had, at best, limited impact on SF capacities and operations on the ground as a result of an incoherence of approach and strategy, as well as gross deficits and deficiencies in leadership.
The declining trend in Maoist-related fatalities has, nevertheless, continued into the early months of 2012, with a total of 96 fatalities between January and March, as against 174 over the same period last year. The ‘incidents of opportunity’ in March 2012, however, are evidence of abiding Maoist strengths, and the continuing infirmity of state responses. Declining trends in fatalities and occasional reverses not-withstanding, it appears that the initiative remains firmly in the hands of the Maoists, and that State leaderships are still to find the will and the clarity of perspective that will allow them to secure any enduring dominance over areas of rebel disruption.
Ajai Sahni, Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute
for Conflict Management & SATP
The worst of these incidents was, of course, the March 27, 2012, improvised explosive device (IED) attack on a Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) transport at Pustola in Gadchiroli District, Maharashtra, which killed 12 and injured 28. In their enthusiasm during CRPF Director General Vijay Kumar’s visit to Fulbodi Gatta to inspect a Community Outreach Programme, the troopers had ignored standard operating procedures (SOPs), driving over a road that had not been sanitized in advance. The Maoists were quick to take bloody advantage.
A loss of lives among SF personnel, however, is easily ignored and quickly forgotten by the Indian state. The abduction of foreigners and the inevitable international media carnival that follows, tends to be far more embarrassing, for much longer, especially when the ‘hostage drama’ extends over weeks. The ‘arrest’ as the Maoists chose to describe it, of two Italians – a tourist and a tour operator – on March 14, 2012, in the Daringbadi Block of Kandhamal District, Odisha, has, consequently, shattered the illusion of an ‘improved internal security situation’ to a far greater extent. While one of the hostages, Claudio Colangelo, was released on March 25, 2012, the second, tour operator Paulo Basusco, continues to be held hostage by the rebels at the time of writing. The abduction occurred while the Italians were moving in areas of Maoist influence, officials claim, against the advice of the administration.
Even as the Italian hostage drama was being played out, a Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA), tribal leader Jhina Hikaka, from the ruling Biju Janata Dal (BJD), was abducted on March 24, 2012, near Laxmipur in Koraput District, Odisha, when he chose to ignore security procedures, to travel through Maoist dominated territories from Semilguda to his constituency, Laxmipur. Hikaka’s vehicle was stopped near Toyaput, and he was abducted after he identified himself.
The Basusco and Hikaka abductions remain unresolved at the time of writing.
Crucially, all three actions were incidents of opportunity, reflecting enduring Maoist capacities, rather than strategic intent or planning, and demonstrating quite clearly that a decline in fatalities is not synonymous with a decline in rebel capacities or with an improvement in the ‘security situation’. Indeed, despite the significant reverses inflicted on the Maoists, especially at the leadership level, as well as some contraction in their areas of operation, the rebels’ disruptive capabilities in their core areas along the purported ‘Red Corridor’, remain substantially intact.
Despite many claims of the cumulative ‘improvement’ in the capacities of central and State Security Forces (SFs), the state’s vulnerabilities remain largely unaddressed. At least some claims of such ‘improvement’ are, in any event, largely falsified or fabricated – including the Union Ministry of Home Affairs’ (UMHA) November 30, 2011, claim that the police-population ratio had been raised to 176 per 100,000, from an National Crime Records Bureau figure of 133 per 100,000 as on December 31, 2010. Others, such as UMHA’s claims of “significant measures taken to strengthen the Indian Police Service” (IPS) remain something of a smokescreen, since existing deficits in the Service will take decades to fill, even with dramatically accelerated intakes. UMHA also claims that “Number of CAPF (Central Armed Police Force) battalions deployed in LWE (Left Wing Extremist) affected States increased from 37 in 2008 to 73 in November 2011, glossing over the fact that this has roughly been the level of deployment since the disastrous ‘massive and coordinated operations’ were launched by the Centre in end-2009. That these Forces have, along with State Police Special Forces, largely been frozen in a passive defensive posture since the Chintalnad massacre of April 2010, and that offensive operations against the Maoist have now become more and more the exception among demoralized SF contingents, remains unsaid.
On the other hand, the anecdotal evidence of state vulnerabilities and disarray is mounting. In one devastating disclosure, the UMHA conceded that as many as 46,000 officers and personnel took voluntary retirement from the CAPF between 2007 and September 2011, while another 5,220 officers and personnel resigned from service over the same period. 461 suicides and 64 instances of fratricides were also recorded. Worse, UMHA noted that the rate of increase of cases of resignation in the CRPF and Border Security Force (BSF) was “alarming”, at more than 70 per cent in 2011, over 2010.
If this dry data was not sufficiently disconcerting, Rahul Sharma, an IPS officer, serving as a Superintendent of Police in the Maoist afflicted Bilaspur District, in the country’s worst affected State, Chhattisgarh, committed suicide on March 12, 2012, blaming his seniors and the political leadership for his decision. Sharma had reportedly confided in a friend that he was frustrated because Police officers were required to do what he called ‘forced labour’ (begaar), and ‘extortion’ (ugahi) and that ‘targets for election expenses’ for the scheduled 2013 Assembly Elections had ‘already been set’. This incident provides extraordinary insight into the use and morale of the Police leadership in the State worst affected by the Maoist insurgency.
Nor is Chhattisgarh an exception. In the wake of the March 27 incident in Gadchiroli, Maharashtra Home Minister R.R. Patil complained that Police officers were ‘unwilling’ to work in the Maoist afflicted Gadchiroli and Chandrapur Districts, citing the recent example of four Police Sub-inspectors, who resigned from the Force after completing training, when they were posted to Gadchiroli. Patil had nothing but a litany of complaints to offer after the Gadchiroli incident, blaming the Centre for a failure to give advance information of Maoist attacks. Unsurprisingly, Maharashtra saw an increase in Maoist related fatalities to 69 in 2011, over the 2010 figure of 40, even as the all-India fatalities almost halved (from 1180 to 602).
The other principal Maoist affected States, Odisha, Jharkhand, West Bengal and Bihar suffer from equal and endemic deficiencies in their security structures, as well as from both ambivalence and infirmity in their political leaderships.
In another shock to the system, and testimony to the incompetence and incapacity of the state establishment, Kobad Ghandy, a CPI-Maoist Politburo member and top party ideologue, was discharged by a Sessions Court for offences under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), due to procedural defects in the prosecution. Ghandy was a prize catch, trapped in Delhi on September 20, 2009, after a protracted operation led by the Andhra Pradesh Special Intelligence Branch, and involving the Intelligence Bureau and Delhi Police. The Sessions Judge, Pawan Kumar Jain, observed,
I am of the considered opinion that there is sufficient material on record to make out a prima facie case for the offence punishable under Sections 20 and 38 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act against accused Kobad Ghandy. But since the cognisance order dated February 19, 2010, qua the offences punishable under the UAPA was not in accordance with the mandatory provisions of Section 45(2) of the UAPA, I hereby discharge accused Kobad Ghandy for the offences punishable under Section 10/13/18/20/38 of the UAPA. Similarly, I also discharge accused Rajinder Kumar for the offences punishable under Section 10/13/18/19/20 UAPA. However, there is sufficient material on record to make out a prima facie case against both the accused for the offences punishable under Section 419/420/468/474/120B Indian Penal Code.
Some augmentation of capacities – recruitment, arming, fortification and modernization – has, no doubt, occurred across the board, both in CAPF and State Forces, but this has had, at best, limited impact on SF capacities and operations on the ground as a result of an incoherence of approach and strategy, as well as gross deficits and deficiencies in leadership.
The declining trend in Maoist-related fatalities has, nevertheless, continued into the early months of 2012, with a total of 96 fatalities between January and March, as against 174 over the same period last year. The ‘incidents of opportunity’ in March 2012, however, are evidence of abiding Maoist strengths, and the continuing infirmity of state responses. Declining trends in fatalities and occasional reverses not-withstanding, it appears that the initiative remains firmly in the hands of the Maoists, and that State leaderships are still to find the will and the clarity of perspective that will allow them to secure any enduring dominance over areas of rebel disruption.
Ajai Sahni, Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute
for Conflict Management & SATP
______________________________________________________________
Profile: India's Maoist rebels
Maoist rebels in Jharkhand in 2010 One of the key demands of the rebels is land redistribution
India's bloody Maoist insurgency began in the remote forests of the state of West Bengal in the late 1960s.
Several decades later it had become, in the words of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, India's "greatest internal security challenge".
Maoists are also known as "Naxalites" because of the violent left-wing uprising in 1967, which began in the West Bengal village of Naxalbari.
Although this was eventually quashed by police, over the years India's Maoists have regrouped and asserted control over vast swathes of land in central and eastern India, establishing a so-called "red corridor". This spans the states of Jharkand, West Bengal, Orissa, Bihar, Chhattisgarh and Andhra Pradesh and also reaches into Uttar Pradesh, and Karnataka. The Maoists and affiliated groups are active in more than a third of India's 600-odd districts, the authorities say. And more than 6,000 people have died in the rebels' long fight for communist rule in these states.
Maoist aims
The Maoists' military leader is Koteshwar Rao, otherwise known as Kishenji.
He reportedly suffered temporary paralysis in June 2010 when a police bullet hit him in the knee.
Normally a regular communicator with the press, Kishenji was little heard of until January 2011 when he issued a statement saying he expected India to succumb to a Maoist revolution by 2025.
Latest estimates suggest he commandes at least 20,000 armed fighters. They are said to get most of their weapons by raiding police bases.
Analysts say the longevity of the Maoist rebellion is partly due to the local support they receive.
The rebels say they are fighting for the rights of indigenous tribespeople and the rural poor who they say have been neglected by governments for decades.
Maoists claim to represent local concerns over land ownership and equitable distribution of resources.
Ultimately they say they want to establish a "communist society" by overthrowing India's "semi-colonial, semi-feudal" form of rule through armed struggle. The BBC's Subir Bhaumik in Calcutta says that while there is little prospect of them making any headway in urban areas - or indeed non-jungle rural areas - the rebels remain a force to be reckoned with in remote areas where the security forces are thin on the ground.
Our correspondent says the key question now is whether to deploy the army against the rebels in the same way it has been used in Indian-administered Kashmir and some north-eastern states. Such a move would be highly controversial, because it would inevitably been seen by some critics as evidence that the rebels are making headway in what is seen by some as "mainland India".
Major rebel attacks
Over the years the Maoists have managed to launch a series of damaging attacks on Indian security forces. Troops hunting for Maoist rebels The government has launched several major offensives against the rebels
In 2009, rebels gained virtual control of Lalgarh district in West Bengal barely 250km (155 miles) from the state capital, Calcutta. For many months, rebels, supported by local villagers, held hundreds of paramilitary forces at bay. The Maoists declared it to be India's first "liberated zone" but Indian security forces finally overwhelmed the rebels.
April 2010 saw rebels ambush paramilitary troops in the dense jungles of central Chhattisgarh state, killing at least 76 soldiers. Correspondents say it was the worst-ever Maoist attack on Indian security forces.
In 2007, also in Chhattisgarh, Maoist rebels killed 55 policemen in an attack on a remote police outpost. Almost every week, Maoist rebels are blamed for minor skirmishes and incidents across India's north-east - common tactics include blowing up railway tracks and attacking police stations.
In 2010, the Maoists faced India's biggest ever anti-Maoist offensive. Nearly 50,000 federal paramilitary troops and tens of thousands of policemen took part in the operation across several states.
While the rebels were pushed back deep into their jungle strongholds, they have continued to carry out hit-and-run attacks and numerous high-profile kidnappings. India's government in turn has pledged to crack down even harder unless rebels renounce violence and enter peace talks. At the same time there have been differences not just within the central government over how to tackle the rebellion, but also between Delhi and various Indian states affected by the insurgency.
Experts say that disagreements over whether to deploy the army against the rebels is a manifestation of these tensions. On one issue however the analysts remain united - the chances of any kind of meaningful dialogue with the rebels in the foreseeable future are slim.
Source: BBC News
Maoist rebels in Jharkhand in 2010 One of the key demands of the rebels is land redistribution
India's bloody Maoist insurgency began in the remote forests of the state of West Bengal in the late 1960s.
Several decades later it had become, in the words of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, India's "greatest internal security challenge".
Maoists are also known as "Naxalites" because of the violent left-wing uprising in 1967, which began in the West Bengal village of Naxalbari.
Although this was eventually quashed by police, over the years India's Maoists have regrouped and asserted control over vast swathes of land in central and eastern India, establishing a so-called "red corridor". This spans the states of Jharkand, West Bengal, Orissa, Bihar, Chhattisgarh and Andhra Pradesh and also reaches into Uttar Pradesh, and Karnataka. The Maoists and affiliated groups are active in more than a third of India's 600-odd districts, the authorities say. And more than 6,000 people have died in the rebels' long fight for communist rule in these states.
Maoist aims
The Maoists' military leader is Koteshwar Rao, otherwise known as Kishenji.
He reportedly suffered temporary paralysis in June 2010 when a police bullet hit him in the knee.
Normally a regular communicator with the press, Kishenji was little heard of until January 2011 when he issued a statement saying he expected India to succumb to a Maoist revolution by 2025.
Latest estimates suggest he commandes at least 20,000 armed fighters. They are said to get most of their weapons by raiding police bases.
Analysts say the longevity of the Maoist rebellion is partly due to the local support they receive.
The rebels say they are fighting for the rights of indigenous tribespeople and the rural poor who they say have been neglected by governments for decades.
Maoists claim to represent local concerns over land ownership and equitable distribution of resources.
Ultimately they say they want to establish a "communist society" by overthrowing India's "semi-colonial, semi-feudal" form of rule through armed struggle. The BBC's Subir Bhaumik in Calcutta says that while there is little prospect of them making any headway in urban areas - or indeed non-jungle rural areas - the rebels remain a force to be reckoned with in remote areas where the security forces are thin on the ground.
Our correspondent says the key question now is whether to deploy the army against the rebels in the same way it has been used in Indian-administered Kashmir and some north-eastern states. Such a move would be highly controversial, because it would inevitably been seen by some critics as evidence that the rebels are making headway in what is seen by some as "mainland India".
Major rebel attacks
Over the years the Maoists have managed to launch a series of damaging attacks on Indian security forces. Troops hunting for Maoist rebels The government has launched several major offensives against the rebels
In 2009, rebels gained virtual control of Lalgarh district in West Bengal barely 250km (155 miles) from the state capital, Calcutta. For many months, rebels, supported by local villagers, held hundreds of paramilitary forces at bay. The Maoists declared it to be India's first "liberated zone" but Indian security forces finally overwhelmed the rebels.
April 2010 saw rebels ambush paramilitary troops in the dense jungles of central Chhattisgarh state, killing at least 76 soldiers. Correspondents say it was the worst-ever Maoist attack on Indian security forces.
In 2007, also in Chhattisgarh, Maoist rebels killed 55 policemen in an attack on a remote police outpost. Almost every week, Maoist rebels are blamed for minor skirmishes and incidents across India's north-east - common tactics include blowing up railway tracks and attacking police stations.
In 2010, the Maoists faced India's biggest ever anti-Maoist offensive. Nearly 50,000 federal paramilitary troops and tens of thousands of policemen took part in the operation across several states.
While the rebels were pushed back deep into their jungle strongholds, they have continued to carry out hit-and-run attacks and numerous high-profile kidnappings. India's government in turn has pledged to crack down even harder unless rebels renounce violence and enter peace talks. At the same time there have been differences not just within the central government over how to tackle the rebellion, but also between Delhi and various Indian states affected by the insurgency.
Experts say that disagreements over whether to deploy the army against the rebels is a manifestation of these tensions. On one issue however the analysts remain united - the chances of any kind of meaningful dialogue with the rebels in the foreseeable future are slim.
Source: BBC News
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