Sections
Indian Secularity in Crisis
Font size:
K. Toshinaro Longchar
Introduction
Despite various political problems and communal riots in the face of multiple ethnic, religious and cultural traditions, the Indian state has proved many critiques wrong in her sheer determination to keep the Indian state intact. It is often pointed out that India is providing a particular form of multicultural democracy under the aegis of secularism. Secularism in an Indian context is not about the separation of religion from the state, rather it indicates, “the state’s and the political parties’ neutrality toward religion and religious beliefs (Ali Engineer:336).” The enticement of secularity in Indian political rhetoric came into being during the formation and construction of political India as a state during the early part of 20th century. It coincided with the departure of the British colonial power. It emerged through the colonial encounter which cultural India had with the British Raj. There is no question that Indian as a cultural entity is ancient. Some date this back to the Indus civilization. For some - to the Aryan settlement and the composition of the Rigveda along the Kabul river and Ganga-Yamuna region. Thereafter there were a series of empires which eventually led the British Raj to build on, and with the ruins of the Mughals. The political make up in cultural Indian comprised of independent Raj and various principalities. But the Indian state as we know today with centralized federal structure, bureaucracy, monetary, administration or citizenship are recent developments. Along this argument Rajni Kothari also points out that, we need to remember that the essential identity of India is cultural, not political and economic. It is one civilization that has withstood various vicissitudes and still endured, largely because of its basic identity being cultural. It never had a political center except very recently (quoted in Nathan: 18).
Despite various political problems and communal riots in the face of multiple ethnic, religious and cultural traditions, the Indian state has proved many critiques wrong in her sheer determination to keep the Indian state intact. It is often pointed out that India is providing a particular form of multicultural democracy under the aegis of secularism. Secularism in an Indian context is not about the separation of religion from the state, rather it indicates, “the state’s and the political parties’ neutrality toward religion and religious beliefs (Ali Engineer:336).” The enticement of secularity in Indian political rhetoric came into being during the formation and construction of political India as a state during the early part of 20th century. It coincided with the departure of the British colonial power. It emerged through the colonial encounter which cultural India had with the British Raj. There is no question that Indian as a cultural entity is ancient. Some date this back to the Indus civilization. For some - to the Aryan settlement and the composition of the Rigveda along the Kabul river and Ganga-Yamuna region. Thereafter there were a series of empires which eventually led the British Raj to build on, and with the ruins of the Mughals. The political make up in cultural Indian comprised of independent Raj and various principalities. But the Indian state as we know today with centralized federal structure, bureaucracy, monetary, administration or citizenship are recent developments. Along this argument Rajni Kothari also points out that, we need to remember that the essential identity of India is cultural, not political and economic. It is one civilization that has withstood various vicissitudes and still endured, largely because of its basic identity being cultural. It never had a political center except very recently (quoted in Nathan: 18).
The wider picture of Naga struggle with India But this secularity and political identity under the Indian state continues to affirm that “Indian civilizational unity is the same thing as its national unity and national existence.” The Government of India after the infamous “Operation Bluestar”, stated in the White Paper on Punjab,
“The Indian people do not accept the proposition that India is a multi-national society. The Indian people constitute one nation. India has expressed through her civilization over the ages, her strong underlying unity in the midst of diversity of language, religion, etc…(quoted in Nathan:18)”
Nehru’s ‘unity in diversity’ and ‘national unity and Indian freedom’ were the essence of Indian history and the ideological position that held the new Indian state (Nathan:18). But the entire ethos of ‘unity’ and ‘freedom’ was “undergrided by a Hindu nationalism (Nigam:70).” Nehru in his famous book, ‘The Discovery of India’ writes unabated, “Indian nationalism was dominated by the Hindus and had a Hindunized look.” The ‘unity in diversity’ though not the same as the Hindutva ( Hinduness or Hindu nationalism) is often regarded as a ‘liberal assimilationist view’( Nathan:18). This view take the position that the Indian state and nation is a “product of an Indian culture that was identified as a Hindu culture (Nathan:18).” This is not to imply that Nehru aggressively identified Indian as Hindu, but it was more a Brahminical concept. “It allows for the existence of various traditions, but insists on their subordination to an over-aching Brahminical framework (ibid:18).” This is because outside the caste system there is no civilization and therefore no glorious history to celebrate and unite, no power to justify cultural and political ‘superiority ’. Indian secularity therefore is not abstract in practice. It has a huge material base and political power dominated by elite as defined by the cultural and civilizational values within the Brahminical concepts.
Dev Nathan’s view that the drive for “Indianization” is based upon an Indian culture, along “the upper-caste Hindu culture of the Hindi belt ( Nathan:21).” This is promoted by attempting to create not only a homogenous but also a uniform Indian national culture centered on the cultural “tradition of Bharatvarsha and Aryavarta.” In such a cultural homogeneity, different traditions and religion will be accommodate not on the basis of equality but on “discrimination and the maintenance of suitable boundaries and distance, with each tradition being allotted a place in the social hierarchy”( Nathan:22) of the Brahminical concept. But Nathan also distinguished two variants of expression within Indianness: “one is the religious concept of Hindutva; and the other is of the ‘secular’ expression of Indianness as based on ancient Indian (identified as Hindu) culture (Nathan: 23).
Depending on the political and cultural formation of a nation, different countries have different defining principles that hold their national identities. According to the political scientist Ashutosh Varshney (quoted in Kakar:19-20), the defining principle that holds the Indian state together both for the secularist and the Hindu nationalist is territory. Territory is the common imagination shared by both. The territorial integrity is seen as the “sacred geography” because its territorial principles were derived in the belief of an “ancient heritage.” On the other hand it brings memories of the Partition. To see the national identity separated from the territory is perceived as “desecration of the sacred geography.” Sudhir Kakar therefore agrees that slogans like, “national unity” and “territorial integrity” are thus highly charged phrases in the Indian political discourses (Kakar:19).”
The memories of Partition and the rationale of ‘sacred geography’ justified Post- Independence India to use military force to quell any form of political movement. Government of India (GoI) followed a strict rule that any such movements will be ignored and “treated as illegitimate” if it is weak, but, “should it develop significant strength, be smashed, with armed forces if necessary ( Brass:7).”
The “doctrine of geo-political compulsion” is another reason cited to help establish the regional hegemony of the Indian state not only for security but also to dispose off “labor surpluses” and “exploits markets.” In that way a bigger expansionist state may “impose its will on weaker neighbors (Nathan:35).”
Growing Trend of Hindu Nationalism:
Historically the right-wing Hindu organization- Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh( RSS, or National Volunteer Association), was founded in 1925. Its mass front-the Vishwa Hindu Parishad ( VHP or World Hindu Council) in 1965. Its political wing- the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP, or Indian People’s Party) around 1980 with Bharatiya Jana Sangh as its predecessor. Collectively they are known as the Sangh Parivar (the Saffron Family or Association). This Hindu nationalist begin to construct a new aggressive Hindu identity, nationalism and revivalism. Their rational: “Members of other religions, if they denied they were Hindus, were also denying that they were Indians (M.S. Golwalkar, quoted in Tambiah:245).”
One of the defining moments in Indian communal politics after the Partition is the Ramjanambhoomi movement. This movement mobilizes Hindus to destroy Babri Masjid (mosque), built by Babur, the Mughal Emperor at Ayodhya in Uttar Pradesh (UP) on the supposedly birthplace of Ram. After the Partition, GoI closed the mosque because of clashes between the Hindus and the Muslims. However in 1984, the VHP started to campaign to re-open the mosque for Hindu worshippers. In 1989, the basis of “shilanyas (laying the foundation stone for the temple building) in Ayodhya took full turn ( Sarkar: 131).
The most dramatic event in this movement was when L.K. Advani, the BJP President began his 10,000 kilometer rath-yatra (chariot pilgrimage) in October 1990, from Sonmath Temple, Gujarat, to be concluded in the Babri Masjid, Ayodhya. Advani traveled in a chariot, pulled by a white Toyota van that resembled the white (representing purity) chariots of legendary Hindu hero Arjuna (as depicted in the popular series Mahabaratha) with lotus posters. Lotus is revered by Hindus because the petals are regarded as the dwelling place of Brahma. Hindus thronged the streets to welcome the rath with garlands, prayers, incenses etc. Somnath, where Advani picked to start his pilgrimage has a myth of splendor as well as of defeat and humiliation for the Hindus. Legend has it that Somanth was the most significant Hindu temple where 1,000 Brahmins were engaged to receive offerings, and give blessing. Around 300 men and women were employed to sing and dance everyday. Its treasury was overflowing with pots of gold, precious gems and silver until Mahmud, the Sultan of Ghazni razed the place and the temple in the 11th century. This rath yatra, full of symbolic and ancient religious sentiments aroused fervent fervour among the Hindus. Advani summoned the Somnath Temple, as the “chosen trauma” of the Hindus for his rath yatra to manipulate cultural and religious memories ( Kakar:47-51).
The communal violence that broke out in the wake of Advani’s rath-yatra is regarded as one of the worst in recent India. Babri Masjid was demolished in December 1992 by the karsevaks (the holy-workers). Advani, Vajpayee, Joshi and various leaders from Sangh Parivar were present to witness the demolition. The demolition was accompanied by intense tension and unprecedented violence in many parts of India. At least 1,200 were reported killed within days. Incidents of arson took place as far as the UK between Indians and Pakistanis, Muslims and Hindus, in Bangladesh and Pakistan ( Tambiah:249-251).
The Hindu strong hold is predominantly restricted amongst the higher caste and the middle class population of UP. But its strength and appeal to the most conservative section nationwide could not be underestimated . The Ayodhya issue in manipulating ancient Hindu memories and glories was becoming an electoral success. The 1991 election led to the success of BJP in UP ( Sarkar:131). In 1984 there was only 2 BJP seats in the Lok Sabha, it climbed to 85 in 1989. By 1991 it became the main opposition party with 120 seats (Tambiah:247). In 1998 it formed the national Government. They went out of power but they have become a formidable focus in secular Indian political discourses. The Sangh Parivar is currently making anti-conversion law to Christianity a huge cultural and political issue.
Bringing into Context: The Naga ethos- The cultural and political narratives of the ‘Other’.
In the light of such political mobilization along religious and cultural discourses in a ‘secular’ Indian Union, the urge of homogenizing through ‘Indianization’ or ‘sanskritization’ is strong. The fear and strength of its intensity lies mainly in two reasons (i) in the absence of a self-identification of Hindu identity, it develops only in the presence of the ‘Other’ for instance a Muslim. The expansion of a Hindu political power and base in secular India would be difficult to exist without the “Muslim question” (Kakar:107) and the “Others” i.e., Christians etc. (ii ) Secondly it increases economic opportunities, and helps to retain the political power by the traditionally higher caste, and emerging bourgeoisie generally from the dominant culture. While these arguments seem radical, Hindu nationalism within secular India is real and a major challenge to the ideals of equality, democracy and the security of minorities in secular India.
There are some school of thoughts that believe in the natural cycle of social processes that make national history ‘whole’. But the historical reality is that there are discontinuities; punctured because of different social forces and political developments. There are also many socio-cultural entities that have ‘disappeared’ as a result. Nagas need to have a serious national conversation with one key issue being the ‘village’ that holds their identity and their land.
The Naga primordial approach to identity, based on their kinship and village heritage of shared ancestors, myth and tradition was key in creating a separate Naga identity. A perceived collective shared ethos cannot be underestimated. As mentioned above the defining feature of the Naga cultural and political identity is in their village polity. It is in understanding the centrality and importance of the village identity that a Naga identity can be understood. Yes, villages, collectively ascribed to a tribe, are formed primarily along language, which is unintelligible to each other. On the other hand the village administration varied from ‘pure democracy’ to some form of ‘autocratic chieftainship’. Nonetheless the three crucial common features that held Nagas together are:
1. Village identity and Territorial rights: Village here means the traditional socio-political kin groupings with exclusive territorial legitimacy and independence; ceremoniously founded by their ancestors and thereby share real, as well as common mythical origins and foundations. A cluster of related or non-related families and individuals in a new ‘settlement’, and forming a village in recent memories is not a ‘traditional’ village in a Naga context. In India, or in the Western context, a form of social grouping, away from the heart of the city and town might qualify as a village. Not so in the Naga traditional ethos. Each village have their own respective ancestral land. There might be private, clan, khel or morung land within the village but the ultimate owner is the village. If a villager is ex-communicated from the village, he/she cannot own or claim his/her private land within the village jurisdiction. Therefore the village land is owned collectively by the villagers. When there was inter-village battle, it was fought to protect their respective villages. In the face of colonial intrusion, Naga villages collectively or individually resisted and fought against the English not to restore the power of the Ahom rule, or to defend the kingdom of any Raja, or Empire. Rather they sacrificed to defend their own individual village land, identity and village honour. Tribal identity, as it is known now, was not developed yet. That’s why village identity and land rights are inseparable. The concept of ‘terra nullius’ (eg. No-man’s land) therefore is not only ethically and legally inapplicable in a Naga context but also invalid. This is where the ‘territorial rights’ of the Nagas were derived from the collective ancestral land of all the villages as ceremoniously founded by their ‘founding forefathers and foremothers’.
2. Egalitarian Society: By egalitarianism, it means their village epistemology is based on - sharing, recognition, respect and ownership. There were no caste or class system in the Naga village. The salient feature of the Naga tribal character is the absence of any form of feudal system in pre-colonial as well as in post colonial Naga society. This supports the community ownership over the territory. This also holds the rationale to Naga communal living. Every family was a cultivator who worked in their traditional jhum or terrace cultivation. Women were highly respected, though they were excluded from direct village administration. Priest or Priestess, and villager administrators existed in the society but they were not in accord with any form of ‘superior’ position in the village. They engaged in the same profession as farmers, for their livelihood as ordinary villagers. There was no standing army. Every able young man in the village were the village ‘army’ and took turns to guard the village. That is why the ‘morung’ or bachelors house, where every young men were members, played a huge role. Every form of village polity and life experience was discussed, deliberated and taught at the morung. Hence there was no social stratification or hierarchy based on labour, wealth or gender. For rich people, status among fellow villagers increased only when they shared their wealth. Distributing and sharing wealth by feeding the whole village community was observed by giving the feasts of merits through various stages of rituals, and celebration in which the slaughter of a mithun was the ultimate symbol of riches and honour. The feather of the hornbill was regarded as a symbolic feature of rare beauty. In ceremonial sacrifices, the rooster was the main object of presentation. In inter-village battle or raids, the spear was the most common weapon. Therefore the rooster, mithun, hornbill, spears and morung have common symbolic representation for the Nagas.
3.Christianity: The critique poured against the ‘missionaries’ is that they discarded many cultural and traditional practices of the Naga villagers as ‘sinful and heathen’. This is not incorrect. It is also true Christianity is not the indigenous Naga religion. But these facts cannot undermine the enormous contribution made by Christianity to the Nagas. Besides teaching the gospels, it holistically brought the message of peaceful co-existence between warring villages, basic hygiene, reading and writing followed by a more systematic formal education. It brought changes, both positives and negatives. It opened the Naga world to different belief system and political ideologies. Christianity became one of the main unifying factors. Christianity despite being argued by some that it is an ‘import’ from the West, had been ‘inculcated’ into the making of Naga identity, thereby creating a sense of belongingness, and with an attitude of ‘us’ and ‘our’ to the Church, as opposed to a ‘they’ and ‘them’ attitude held towards the Indian Governmental institutions. While Christianity in India was seen as anti-national, an alien culture, anti-Hindu, Nagas embraced it as its’ own by emulating their traditional beliefs within the Christian belief system. By the 1940s and 1950s, it was symbolized as a socio-political action to assert their identity as separate from the Indian whom they saw mainly as Hindus.
IV. The Challenges:
Naga cultural and socio-political discourses cannot be validated without the essence of the village. With time, the functions and the character of the village might change. Villages might be forced to address critical issues beyond the sacred belief of space and time immemorial, or even citizenship that strongly upholds the sons and daughters of the soil. But the village is not only the core, it is the defining feature of being a Naga by ascribing them to a tribe. That’s why during changing times, such as now in the 21st century, Nagas need to deliberate consciously on the changing role and the essence of a village. It should discuss how the multiple Naga identities, i.e., respective clan, village, tribe, and Naga in general can related and communicate with each other on one hand, and with the Indian Union on the other.
The initial formation of a distinct cultural Naga entity was based on the village independence, identity and land; shared customs, tradition, myth and dietary among various villages, which was found beyond tribal boundaries. However it was the fear of assimilation and oppression in the hands of outsiders, the partial administration of the Naga Hills by the British and the advent of Christianity that were critical to create the awareness of their respective tribal identity and a collective Naga political identity. This I will call ‘defensive communal interest’. However today they need more than this ‘defensive communal interest’. They need an ‘inclusive interest’ which encompasses regional stability as well as political, economic, relational, land and power sharing.
Christianity in a Naga context is not only a religious institution but also an era of a new cultural and political entity. But in the Hindu cultural context in India, their religion is to maintain the unity and power of Hindu nationalism based on the ancient memories and strong high caste bourgeoisie. Christianity among the Nagas is torn between the presentation of Church as a place of worship and the pulpit sermon, and the separation of the Church from the politics of the Nagas. Naga Christianity should interpret Naga cultural heritage, especially in terms of land ownership, distribution of wealth and justice, a platform for the poor, powerless and weak in society, the position of women and accountability of leadership to people to make it relevant.. The ‘Naga church’ must inculcate within their structure the ethos of ‘egalitarianism’ that their Naga forefathers adherently practiced.
Nagas must question the territorial integrity of the Indian Union within the political discourse of Indian “sacred geography.” In this perspective a crucial piece of historical misinterpretation needs to be corrected. Nagas were not a part of the Brahminical sacred ‘geographical imagination’. If the ‘Brahminical concept’ presumed in their secularity that Nagas will become a part of that geography like many ‘Others’ in the Indian Union; Nagas starkly opposed and rejected that ‘imagination’ in 1929 to the Simon Commission, and declared independence in August 14th 1947. Both in cultural and historical experiences, Nagas form a separate unit both from the Indian cultural civilization and political imagination. The question of Nagas seeking independence from cultural India is therefore incorrect. Rather, based on the structural reality of the cultural India and a Naga nation, on the eve of the colonial departure, the British Raj facilitated the Indian Union as a state, while for the Nagas, their political actions as an evolving nation were legitimized in their declaration that they were separate from any other political state including the Indian Union. Because of GoI’s political power and superiority, Nagas were coerced within the Indian Union, but this act of coercion does not nullify these historical facts. The protracted conflict between GoI and Nagas is largely due to the Nagas determination not to abandon their claim for ‘an ‘independent state’ and GoI’s inability to coerce the Nagas into denouncing their historical political actions. In that light they must re-imagine whether they share any similarities in the collective imagination and history of the cultural Indian civilization. It should also look critically at the Brahminical concept of caste structure in the light of Naga village egalitarianism. But the geo-political reality is that the Indian Union and Nagaland share political boundaries, with Nagaland in a frontier of a huge strategical significance to the Indian hegemony. Security and stability in the region requires both GoI and the Nagas to negotiate, and co-operate. A ‘mature political dialogue’ of inter-dependence rather than coercive political control is the way to begin.
The crucial question therefore is: Is there a place for a unique historical and political entity like the Nagas for a political arrangement within or outside the highly centralized Indian Union?
Yes, there is the Indian Constitution in Article 371A and other supplementary Acts that might provide special provision to ‘Nagaland state’. But it can also be removed, when it is chosen to do so. Other Regulations and Acts that nullify the ‘Special Provision.’ and rights.** can also be implemented. Because India as ancient as her civilization might be is still an evolving young nation state, and India’s interest is her prime pursuit, like any other nation-state. In fact even the so call ‘classical nation-states’ like France, England and Germany re-amend their constitutions and laws according to the changing realities of socio-political order.
The daunting reality becomes even clearer when it is considered that Nagas do not comprise even a minuscule one percent of the India’s colossal population, their position is very vulnerable to say the least. In other words they cannot take the so called provisions in the Indian Constitution and Law as an ‘Undeletable Statute.’ This reflects the lack of political and cultural security for Nagas. On the other hand, even when the Indian Constitution states there is protection for Naga customary laws and socio-religious practice, each individual village, within the various Naga tribes, independently follows their individual village procedure. There is no cohesion or a codified reference from the various Naga traditions. These facts bring us to the core of the argument - Naga solidarity based on individual defensive communal interest and the secularity of India in the light of increasing Indianization cannot be taken for granted.
The Indo-Naga political problem should not overlook the fact that Nagas are ebbing slowly into a systematic process of ‘Indianization’ and ‘sanskritization’. In fact this in itself is a political action. The introduction of BJP in the federal unit of Nagaland state is very telling of such influences. Nagaland state leaders might have their arguments and interests but the fact is, it cannot be separated from the RSS-VHP-BJP (Sangh Parivar) rationale of India for Hindus and Hindus for India; and the geographical sacredness of the Indian Union. ‘Hindi language’ as a compulsory language in schools in Nagaland cannot be underestimated either. While acquiring a new language as beautiful as Hindi is an asset, it should be taught within the cultural and political usage and promotion of the language. Each Naga tribal language should be developed and taught for the preservation and promotion of its richness at home, in the public sphere, and in schools to students.
V. Conclusion:
While Nagas collectively share an acute sense of political awareness, what Nagas need to discuss and identify is whether Naga is one of the separate ethnic identities within the secular domain of ‘unity in diversity’ or a separate ‘national identity’? An objective understanding of the Naga identity is crucial to any political arrangement with the GoI. Any political arrangement should take into serious consideration the regional stability; security and interest of the Naga languages, religion, culture, village territory and political identity. A common political vision and a critical reading of the Naga political development and existing situation is essential.
Nagas should reach out to the open minded Indian masses. Despite the differences in experiences and beliefs it is to the underlying basis of humanity, and security that they must appeal. Their co-operation is not only to share histories and experiences, but to critique the structural injustices and violence. It is to voice out against oppression and manipulation of the weak and powerless of the Nagas and of the many Indian subalterns, caught in the powerful nexus between the cultural and the highly centralized political structure of the Indian state politics. In critiquing it must envision secure and peaceful co-existence in the shared humanity of both the Nagas and the Indian Union of different caste, ethnic and religion in a socio-political space conditioned by equality, trust, justice, and respect.
Note
The writer can be contacted at < Toshinaro.longchar@gmail.com>
“The Indian people do not accept the proposition that India is a multi-national society. The Indian people constitute one nation. India has expressed through her civilization over the ages, her strong underlying unity in the midst of diversity of language, religion, etc…(quoted in Nathan:18)”
Nehru’s ‘unity in diversity’ and ‘national unity and Indian freedom’ were the essence of Indian history and the ideological position that held the new Indian state (Nathan:18). But the entire ethos of ‘unity’ and ‘freedom’ was “undergrided by a Hindu nationalism (Nigam:70).” Nehru in his famous book, ‘The Discovery of India’ writes unabated, “Indian nationalism was dominated by the Hindus and had a Hindunized look.” The ‘unity in diversity’ though not the same as the Hindutva ( Hinduness or Hindu nationalism) is often regarded as a ‘liberal assimilationist view’( Nathan:18). This view take the position that the Indian state and nation is a “product of an Indian culture that was identified as a Hindu culture (Nathan:18).” This is not to imply that Nehru aggressively identified Indian as Hindu, but it was more a Brahminical concept. “It allows for the existence of various traditions, but insists on their subordination to an over-aching Brahminical framework (ibid:18).” This is because outside the caste system there is no civilization and therefore no glorious history to celebrate and unite, no power to justify cultural and political ‘superiority ’. Indian secularity therefore is not abstract in practice. It has a huge material base and political power dominated by elite as defined by the cultural and civilizational values within the Brahminical concepts.
Dev Nathan’s view that the drive for “Indianization” is based upon an Indian culture, along “the upper-caste Hindu culture of the Hindi belt ( Nathan:21).” This is promoted by attempting to create not only a homogenous but also a uniform Indian national culture centered on the cultural “tradition of Bharatvarsha and Aryavarta.” In such a cultural homogeneity, different traditions and religion will be accommodate not on the basis of equality but on “discrimination and the maintenance of suitable boundaries and distance, with each tradition being allotted a place in the social hierarchy”( Nathan:22) of the Brahminical concept. But Nathan also distinguished two variants of expression within Indianness: “one is the religious concept of Hindutva; and the other is of the ‘secular’ expression of Indianness as based on ancient Indian (identified as Hindu) culture (Nathan: 23).
Depending on the political and cultural formation of a nation, different countries have different defining principles that hold their national identities. According to the political scientist Ashutosh Varshney (quoted in Kakar:19-20), the defining principle that holds the Indian state together both for the secularist and the Hindu nationalist is territory. Territory is the common imagination shared by both. The territorial integrity is seen as the “sacred geography” because its territorial principles were derived in the belief of an “ancient heritage.” On the other hand it brings memories of the Partition. To see the national identity separated from the territory is perceived as “desecration of the sacred geography.” Sudhir Kakar therefore agrees that slogans like, “national unity” and “territorial integrity” are thus highly charged phrases in the Indian political discourses (Kakar:19).”
The memories of Partition and the rationale of ‘sacred geography’ justified Post- Independence India to use military force to quell any form of political movement. Government of India (GoI) followed a strict rule that any such movements will be ignored and “treated as illegitimate” if it is weak, but, “should it develop significant strength, be smashed, with armed forces if necessary ( Brass:7).”
The “doctrine of geo-political compulsion” is another reason cited to help establish the regional hegemony of the Indian state not only for security but also to dispose off “labor surpluses” and “exploits markets.” In that way a bigger expansionist state may “impose its will on weaker neighbors (Nathan:35).”
Growing Trend of Hindu Nationalism:
Historically the right-wing Hindu organization- Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh( RSS, or National Volunteer Association), was founded in 1925. Its mass front-the Vishwa Hindu Parishad ( VHP or World Hindu Council) in 1965. Its political wing- the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP, or Indian People’s Party) around 1980 with Bharatiya Jana Sangh as its predecessor. Collectively they are known as the Sangh Parivar (the Saffron Family or Association). This Hindu nationalist begin to construct a new aggressive Hindu identity, nationalism and revivalism. Their rational: “Members of other religions, if they denied they were Hindus, were also denying that they were Indians (M.S. Golwalkar, quoted in Tambiah:245).”
One of the defining moments in Indian communal politics after the Partition is the Ramjanambhoomi movement. This movement mobilizes Hindus to destroy Babri Masjid (mosque), built by Babur, the Mughal Emperor at Ayodhya in Uttar Pradesh (UP) on the supposedly birthplace of Ram. After the Partition, GoI closed the mosque because of clashes between the Hindus and the Muslims. However in 1984, the VHP started to campaign to re-open the mosque for Hindu worshippers. In 1989, the basis of “shilanyas (laying the foundation stone for the temple building) in Ayodhya took full turn ( Sarkar: 131).
The most dramatic event in this movement was when L.K. Advani, the BJP President began his 10,000 kilometer rath-yatra (chariot pilgrimage) in October 1990, from Sonmath Temple, Gujarat, to be concluded in the Babri Masjid, Ayodhya. Advani traveled in a chariot, pulled by a white Toyota van that resembled the white (representing purity) chariots of legendary Hindu hero Arjuna (as depicted in the popular series Mahabaratha) with lotus posters. Lotus is revered by Hindus because the petals are regarded as the dwelling place of Brahma. Hindus thronged the streets to welcome the rath with garlands, prayers, incenses etc. Somnath, where Advani picked to start his pilgrimage has a myth of splendor as well as of defeat and humiliation for the Hindus. Legend has it that Somanth was the most significant Hindu temple where 1,000 Brahmins were engaged to receive offerings, and give blessing. Around 300 men and women were employed to sing and dance everyday. Its treasury was overflowing with pots of gold, precious gems and silver until Mahmud, the Sultan of Ghazni razed the place and the temple in the 11th century. This rath yatra, full of symbolic and ancient religious sentiments aroused fervent fervour among the Hindus. Advani summoned the Somnath Temple, as the “chosen trauma” of the Hindus for his rath yatra to manipulate cultural and religious memories ( Kakar:47-51).
The communal violence that broke out in the wake of Advani’s rath-yatra is regarded as one of the worst in recent India. Babri Masjid was demolished in December 1992 by the karsevaks (the holy-workers). Advani, Vajpayee, Joshi and various leaders from Sangh Parivar were present to witness the demolition. The demolition was accompanied by intense tension and unprecedented violence in many parts of India. At least 1,200 were reported killed within days. Incidents of arson took place as far as the UK between Indians and Pakistanis, Muslims and Hindus, in Bangladesh and Pakistan ( Tambiah:249-251).
The Hindu strong hold is predominantly restricted amongst the higher caste and the middle class population of UP. But its strength and appeal to the most conservative section nationwide could not be underestimated . The Ayodhya issue in manipulating ancient Hindu memories and glories was becoming an electoral success. The 1991 election led to the success of BJP in UP ( Sarkar:131). In 1984 there was only 2 BJP seats in the Lok Sabha, it climbed to 85 in 1989. By 1991 it became the main opposition party with 120 seats (Tambiah:247). In 1998 it formed the national Government. They went out of power but they have become a formidable focus in secular Indian political discourses. The Sangh Parivar is currently making anti-conversion law to Christianity a huge cultural and political issue.
Bringing into Context: The Naga ethos- The cultural and political narratives of the ‘Other’.
In the light of such political mobilization along religious and cultural discourses in a ‘secular’ Indian Union, the urge of homogenizing through ‘Indianization’ or ‘sanskritization’ is strong. The fear and strength of its intensity lies mainly in two reasons (i) in the absence of a self-identification of Hindu identity, it develops only in the presence of the ‘Other’ for instance a Muslim. The expansion of a Hindu political power and base in secular India would be difficult to exist without the “Muslim question” (Kakar:107) and the “Others” i.e., Christians etc. (ii ) Secondly it increases economic opportunities, and helps to retain the political power by the traditionally higher caste, and emerging bourgeoisie generally from the dominant culture. While these arguments seem radical, Hindu nationalism within secular India is real and a major challenge to the ideals of equality, democracy and the security of minorities in secular India.
There are some school of thoughts that believe in the natural cycle of social processes that make national history ‘whole’. But the historical reality is that there are discontinuities; punctured because of different social forces and political developments. There are also many socio-cultural entities that have ‘disappeared’ as a result. Nagas need to have a serious national conversation with one key issue being the ‘village’ that holds their identity and their land.
The Naga primordial approach to identity, based on their kinship and village heritage of shared ancestors, myth and tradition was key in creating a separate Naga identity. A perceived collective shared ethos cannot be underestimated. As mentioned above the defining feature of the Naga cultural and political identity is in their village polity. It is in understanding the centrality and importance of the village identity that a Naga identity can be understood. Yes, villages, collectively ascribed to a tribe, are formed primarily along language, which is unintelligible to each other. On the other hand the village administration varied from ‘pure democracy’ to some form of ‘autocratic chieftainship’. Nonetheless the three crucial common features that held Nagas together are:
1. Village identity and Territorial rights: Village here means the traditional socio-political kin groupings with exclusive territorial legitimacy and independence; ceremoniously founded by their ancestors and thereby share real, as well as common mythical origins and foundations. A cluster of related or non-related families and individuals in a new ‘settlement’, and forming a village in recent memories is not a ‘traditional’ village in a Naga context. In India, or in the Western context, a form of social grouping, away from the heart of the city and town might qualify as a village. Not so in the Naga traditional ethos. Each village have their own respective ancestral land. There might be private, clan, khel or morung land within the village but the ultimate owner is the village. If a villager is ex-communicated from the village, he/she cannot own or claim his/her private land within the village jurisdiction. Therefore the village land is owned collectively by the villagers. When there was inter-village battle, it was fought to protect their respective villages. In the face of colonial intrusion, Naga villages collectively or individually resisted and fought against the English not to restore the power of the Ahom rule, or to defend the kingdom of any Raja, or Empire. Rather they sacrificed to defend their own individual village land, identity and village honour. Tribal identity, as it is known now, was not developed yet. That’s why village identity and land rights are inseparable. The concept of ‘terra nullius’ (eg. No-man’s land) therefore is not only ethically and legally inapplicable in a Naga context but also invalid. This is where the ‘territorial rights’ of the Nagas were derived from the collective ancestral land of all the villages as ceremoniously founded by their ‘founding forefathers and foremothers’.
2. Egalitarian Society: By egalitarianism, it means their village epistemology is based on - sharing, recognition, respect and ownership. There were no caste or class system in the Naga village. The salient feature of the Naga tribal character is the absence of any form of feudal system in pre-colonial as well as in post colonial Naga society. This supports the community ownership over the territory. This also holds the rationale to Naga communal living. Every family was a cultivator who worked in their traditional jhum or terrace cultivation. Women were highly respected, though they were excluded from direct village administration. Priest or Priestess, and villager administrators existed in the society but they were not in accord with any form of ‘superior’ position in the village. They engaged in the same profession as farmers, for their livelihood as ordinary villagers. There was no standing army. Every able young man in the village were the village ‘army’ and took turns to guard the village. That is why the ‘morung’ or bachelors house, where every young men were members, played a huge role. Every form of village polity and life experience was discussed, deliberated and taught at the morung. Hence there was no social stratification or hierarchy based on labour, wealth or gender. For rich people, status among fellow villagers increased only when they shared their wealth. Distributing and sharing wealth by feeding the whole village community was observed by giving the feasts of merits through various stages of rituals, and celebration in which the slaughter of a mithun was the ultimate symbol of riches and honour. The feather of the hornbill was regarded as a symbolic feature of rare beauty. In ceremonial sacrifices, the rooster was the main object of presentation. In inter-village battle or raids, the spear was the most common weapon. Therefore the rooster, mithun, hornbill, spears and morung have common symbolic representation for the Nagas.
3.Christianity: The critique poured against the ‘missionaries’ is that they discarded many cultural and traditional practices of the Naga villagers as ‘sinful and heathen’. This is not incorrect. It is also true Christianity is not the indigenous Naga religion. But these facts cannot undermine the enormous contribution made by Christianity to the Nagas. Besides teaching the gospels, it holistically brought the message of peaceful co-existence between warring villages, basic hygiene, reading and writing followed by a more systematic formal education. It brought changes, both positives and negatives. It opened the Naga world to different belief system and political ideologies. Christianity became one of the main unifying factors. Christianity despite being argued by some that it is an ‘import’ from the West, had been ‘inculcated’ into the making of Naga identity, thereby creating a sense of belongingness, and with an attitude of ‘us’ and ‘our’ to the Church, as opposed to a ‘they’ and ‘them’ attitude held towards the Indian Governmental institutions. While Christianity in India was seen as anti-national, an alien culture, anti-Hindu, Nagas embraced it as its’ own by emulating their traditional beliefs within the Christian belief system. By the 1940s and 1950s, it was symbolized as a socio-political action to assert their identity as separate from the Indian whom they saw mainly as Hindus.
IV. The Challenges:
Naga cultural and socio-political discourses cannot be validated without the essence of the village. With time, the functions and the character of the village might change. Villages might be forced to address critical issues beyond the sacred belief of space and time immemorial, or even citizenship that strongly upholds the sons and daughters of the soil. But the village is not only the core, it is the defining feature of being a Naga by ascribing them to a tribe. That’s why during changing times, such as now in the 21st century, Nagas need to deliberate consciously on the changing role and the essence of a village. It should discuss how the multiple Naga identities, i.e., respective clan, village, tribe, and Naga in general can related and communicate with each other on one hand, and with the Indian Union on the other.
The initial formation of a distinct cultural Naga entity was based on the village independence, identity and land; shared customs, tradition, myth and dietary among various villages, which was found beyond tribal boundaries. However it was the fear of assimilation and oppression in the hands of outsiders, the partial administration of the Naga Hills by the British and the advent of Christianity that were critical to create the awareness of their respective tribal identity and a collective Naga political identity. This I will call ‘defensive communal interest’. However today they need more than this ‘defensive communal interest’. They need an ‘inclusive interest’ which encompasses regional stability as well as political, economic, relational, land and power sharing.
Christianity in a Naga context is not only a religious institution but also an era of a new cultural and political entity. But in the Hindu cultural context in India, their religion is to maintain the unity and power of Hindu nationalism based on the ancient memories and strong high caste bourgeoisie. Christianity among the Nagas is torn between the presentation of Church as a place of worship and the pulpit sermon, and the separation of the Church from the politics of the Nagas. Naga Christianity should interpret Naga cultural heritage, especially in terms of land ownership, distribution of wealth and justice, a platform for the poor, powerless and weak in society, the position of women and accountability of leadership to people to make it relevant.. The ‘Naga church’ must inculcate within their structure the ethos of ‘egalitarianism’ that their Naga forefathers adherently practiced.
Nagas must question the territorial integrity of the Indian Union within the political discourse of Indian “sacred geography.” In this perspective a crucial piece of historical misinterpretation needs to be corrected. Nagas were not a part of the Brahminical sacred ‘geographical imagination’. If the ‘Brahminical concept’ presumed in their secularity that Nagas will become a part of that geography like many ‘Others’ in the Indian Union; Nagas starkly opposed and rejected that ‘imagination’ in 1929 to the Simon Commission, and declared independence in August 14th 1947. Both in cultural and historical experiences, Nagas form a separate unit both from the Indian cultural civilization and political imagination. The question of Nagas seeking independence from cultural India is therefore incorrect. Rather, based on the structural reality of the cultural India and a Naga nation, on the eve of the colonial departure, the British Raj facilitated the Indian Union as a state, while for the Nagas, their political actions as an evolving nation were legitimized in their declaration that they were separate from any other political state including the Indian Union. Because of GoI’s political power and superiority, Nagas were coerced within the Indian Union, but this act of coercion does not nullify these historical facts. The protracted conflict between GoI and Nagas is largely due to the Nagas determination not to abandon their claim for ‘an ‘independent state’ and GoI’s inability to coerce the Nagas into denouncing their historical political actions. In that light they must re-imagine whether they share any similarities in the collective imagination and history of the cultural Indian civilization. It should also look critically at the Brahminical concept of caste structure in the light of Naga village egalitarianism. But the geo-political reality is that the Indian Union and Nagaland share political boundaries, with Nagaland in a frontier of a huge strategical significance to the Indian hegemony. Security and stability in the region requires both GoI and the Nagas to negotiate, and co-operate. A ‘mature political dialogue’ of inter-dependence rather than coercive political control is the way to begin.
The crucial question therefore is: Is there a place for a unique historical and political entity like the Nagas for a political arrangement within or outside the highly centralized Indian Union?
Yes, there is the Indian Constitution in Article 371A and other supplementary Acts that might provide special provision to ‘Nagaland state’. But it can also be removed, when it is chosen to do so. Other Regulations and Acts that nullify the ‘Special Provision.’ and rights.** can also be implemented. Because India as ancient as her civilization might be is still an evolving young nation state, and India’s interest is her prime pursuit, like any other nation-state. In fact even the so call ‘classical nation-states’ like France, England and Germany re-amend their constitutions and laws according to the changing realities of socio-political order.
The daunting reality becomes even clearer when it is considered that Nagas do not comprise even a minuscule one percent of the India’s colossal population, their position is very vulnerable to say the least. In other words they cannot take the so called provisions in the Indian Constitution and Law as an ‘Undeletable Statute.’ This reflects the lack of political and cultural security for Nagas. On the other hand, even when the Indian Constitution states there is protection for Naga customary laws and socio-religious practice, each individual village, within the various Naga tribes, independently follows their individual village procedure. There is no cohesion or a codified reference from the various Naga traditions. These facts bring us to the core of the argument - Naga solidarity based on individual defensive communal interest and the secularity of India in the light of increasing Indianization cannot be taken for granted.
The Indo-Naga political problem should not overlook the fact that Nagas are ebbing slowly into a systematic process of ‘Indianization’ and ‘sanskritization’. In fact this in itself is a political action. The introduction of BJP in the federal unit of Nagaland state is very telling of such influences. Nagaland state leaders might have their arguments and interests but the fact is, it cannot be separated from the RSS-VHP-BJP (Sangh Parivar) rationale of India for Hindus and Hindus for India; and the geographical sacredness of the Indian Union. ‘Hindi language’ as a compulsory language in schools in Nagaland cannot be underestimated either. While acquiring a new language as beautiful as Hindi is an asset, it should be taught within the cultural and political usage and promotion of the language. Each Naga tribal language should be developed and taught for the preservation and promotion of its richness at home, in the public sphere, and in schools to students.
V. Conclusion:
While Nagas collectively share an acute sense of political awareness, what Nagas need to discuss and identify is whether Naga is one of the separate ethnic identities within the secular domain of ‘unity in diversity’ or a separate ‘national identity’? An objective understanding of the Naga identity is crucial to any political arrangement with the GoI. Any political arrangement should take into serious consideration the regional stability; security and interest of the Naga languages, religion, culture, village territory and political identity. A common political vision and a critical reading of the Naga political development and existing situation is essential.
Nagas should reach out to the open minded Indian masses. Despite the differences in experiences and beliefs it is to the underlying basis of humanity, and security that they must appeal. Their co-operation is not only to share histories and experiences, but to critique the structural injustices and violence. It is to voice out against oppression and manipulation of the weak and powerless of the Nagas and of the many Indian subalterns, caught in the powerful nexus between the cultural and the highly centralized political structure of the Indian state politics. In critiquing it must envision secure and peaceful co-existence in the shared humanity of both the Nagas and the Indian Union of different caste, ethnic and religion in a socio-political space conditioned by equality, trust, justice, and respect.
Note
* I am indebted to Jude Lal Fernando whose vast knowledge and articulation on the subject of Indian secularity, helped and encouraged me in the research and the development of the ideas in this paper. I thank Colm Kelly and Tiatemsu Longchar on their critical comments on the draft of the paper.
The writer can be contacted at < Toshinaro.longchar@gmail.com>
del.icio.us
Digg
TechnoratiGuidelines: You share in The Morung Express community, so please keep your comments smart, civil and constructive. Don't attack other readers personally, and keep your language decent. Use the "Report Abuse" button to make a difference.
Email to a friend
Print version
Plain text
Comments (3 posted):
You could do better than that.You have not appreciated the beauty of the conflict between the righteous and the self righteous.The war among or between the different religions and tribes today.This are a few evils torturing our society today!
Please also mention blindly aping the west!
Post your comment