Ceasefire Flaw or End Game?

The hard earned Indo-Naga peace process now in its twelfth year has endured many ups and downs to the point of testing the limits of both sides on more than one occasion. But to the credit of both the Government of India and the National Socialist Council of Nagalim, the greater cause for a peaceful resolution of the Indo-Naga political problem has ensured that the peace process has survived the rough weather till today. However the recent stand-off between the Army of the NSCN and the Indian Armed Forces at Shiroi in Ukhrul district under Manipur State is by far one of the most serious of threats to the hard earned peace process. A quick and peaceful resolution of the current crisis is required in order to save the ceasefire and peace process from collapsing. While there has been finger pointing of who is to blame for the current impasse, it is extremely surprising to note that for two entity i.e. the Government of India and the NSCN, clarity of thought on major points and basic trust appears to be lacking. How else will one explain the fact that the two sides have been talking to each other for the last over ten years and yet ambiguity remains on some very important points in the ceasefire agreement? The other tragedy is that the standoff at Shiroi has entered into the end of the second week and despite being peace partners for the last twelve years, the two have not been able to mutually resolve the problem. This shows either a fundamental flaw in the ceasefire agreement or could it be the break down of political trust. Both these needs to be rectified if the ceasefire has to hold and the peace process survive.

One of the basic flaws in the ceasefire agreement is the ambiguity in the ‘territorial scope’ of the ground rules and whether ceasing fire extends beyond Nagaland. While it is understandable given the sensitivity of other North East States involved, for the Government of India to clearly spell out the scope of the ceasefire beyond Nagaland State, yet the question now is whether it is time to clearly point out the same because it does not make sense to confine a ceasefire agreement to Nagaland State alone. The NSCN operates in other Naga areas contiguous to Nagaland. So does it then mean that the GoI and NSCN ceasefire in Nagaland but continue to fight militarily elsewhere? If this is the logic, then how can the peace process sustain. One can almost guess that even Delhi is aware that having a ceasefire agreement with territorial limit is illogical. What is distressing though is the dilly dallying by the political establishment in Delhi over the territorial scope of the ceasefire. It may be recalled that Mr Kaushal Swaraj, the former representative of the Prime Minister of India officially declared in public that the “matter relating to cease-fire has been considered by the Government of India at the highest level. It is not limited to Nagaland State as was earlier interpreted”. He goes on to state that the cease-fire area coverage is without any geographical limitation”. This was sometime in June 1998 at the initial stage of the ceasefire. But Delhi went back on its official line. The Government of India’s flip flop is further evidenced by the fact that K. Padmanabhaiah, the interlocutor in the Naga peace talks, in a letter to the NSCN (IM) Chairman reiterated that the ceasefire agreement cannot be extended beyond the current boundaries of Nagaland. Yet again in June 14, 2001, while extending the cease-fire with the NSCN (IM), Delhi extended the area of coverage into the Naga inhabited States of the northeast region thereby giving legitimacy to the term ‘ceasefire without territorial limits’.
An interesting point that should be noted here is that the text of the ceasefire ground rules agreed between Delhi and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland—Khaplang begins at the top by clearly writing that the ground rules will be valid only for the State of Nagaland. No such thing is mentioned in the ground rules between Government of India and NSCN-IM. Obviously one can therefore infer that the Government of India has taken a liberal view on the matter of coverage of the ceasefire. But then unless there is a clear mention of this in the text agreement there is bound to be confusion and misinterpretation on both sides. Even some of the media persons writing on this have got some of their points wrong. One such news report states that “according to ceasefire ground rules NSCN-IM cannot set camps anywhere outside the territory of Nagaland”. But nowhere does it mention in the ceasefire agreement about setting up of designated camps in Nagaland or outside of it. The only point mentioned is that the NSCN will notify list of all its camps to the CFMG who after due consultation would declare them as the designated camps. If this is so, there is no reason why such a camp should not be ‘designated’ as such in Shiroi. After all there is already three other designated camps in Manipur. Having another one at Shiroi or some other place in Ukhrul district should not become a bone of contention for either side. This can be mutually agreed through the Ceasefire Monitoring Group.

But then one is made to seriously wonder as to whether the impasse actually goes beyond Shiroi. Has political negotiation reached a dead end? Have we reached the end game? Is Shiroi the beginning of the end? If all these questions are factors in the current crisis then the stand-off at Shiroi is as a matter of fact speaking not only a reflection of the flaws in the ceasefire but also the strain of hard political negotiation of over ten years, which is showing in the relationship between the two entities. Both the Government of India and the NSCN will have to take a serious re-look into some of these points if at all the peace process is to survive. As for the immediate crisis in Shiroi, both sides should revert to point eight of the ceasefire agreement whereby it is “agreed that any accidental encounter or violation should not be allowed to jeopardize the peace process and the effect of any such incident should be localized through mutual consultations”. Likewise, all cases of violation, if any, of these ground rules should be referred to the Ceasefire Monitoring Groups, so that the reasons for violation are identified and steps to be taken to prevent such violation in future are suggested. For both Delhi and the NSCN this is indeed a litmus test of political will. Neither the NSCN nor the Government of India should equate the Indo-Naga peace process as a zero-sum game where nobody wins. It is about mutual respect and reciprocity.