When it came to China, my mother, an Army wife, used to tell her son, a General, “With Pakistan India is cocky but when it comes to China it becomes a mouse.” That was some 10 years ago. Last week, at Bali, during the East Asia Summit, we were told by Indian officials accompanying Prime Minister Manmohan Singh that he acted tough by rejecting China’s objections to India’s presence in South China Sea and told Premier Wen Jiabao that our interests were “purely commercial”. Equally firmly, Mr Wen warned ‘outside forces’ from getting embroiled in disputes in South China Sea. The warning was repeated on Monday. Will New Delhi back down? Let’s see.
Mr Singh has repeatedly said there is “enough space for the rise of both India and China”. But Beijing says that space is in certain areas of cooperation. Besides already becoming Air India’s Frequent Flier of 2011, Mr Singh, by his own admission, has met top Chinese leaders 28 times. That’s another record for any Indian Prime Minister.
Except for trade which is mainly to China’s advantage, there is little else to glow about. Chinese transgressions on the border continue. Their military buildup has outstripped our conventional deterrence. Beijing has quietly excised 2,000 km of the Ladakh border de facto trilateralising the bilateral Kashmir dispute.The India-China dispute is ready for entry in the Tussaud’s museum.
Numerically border negotiations have overtaken Mr Singh’s record meetings with Chinese leaders. Eight rounds from 1981 to 1987, 14 rounds from 1988 to 2001; 13 rounds since 2003 till the 14th dialogue between Special Representatives later this month. Both sides have sequentially toyed with ‘swap of territory’, delineation of Line of Actual Control and the ongoing political, economic and strategic dialogue.
India missed out on the swap deal in the 1960s. The Chinese backed off from exchange of maps fearing the LAC would become hostage to the presence of Indian troops. The current three-stage talks —agreement on political parameters, framework for delineation and the actual delineation — are deadlocked after China reneged on the agreement on not disturbing settled areas. Since then, only the two Special Representatives know what is going on. China has successfully diverted the border problem towards economic and strategic issues. The chimera of a breakthrough is posited even as Mr Singh repeatedly urges his interlocutors to expedite resolution of the border dispute.
A new joint mechanism for maintaining peace and tranquility on the un-demarcated LAC is in the offing even as China has quietly pushed troops into Gilgit-Baltistan, illegally excised from Pakistan Occupied Kashmir by Pakistan. The rationale for the glacial pace of border talks was confirmed last week at a seminar at New Delhi’s United Services Institution by the articulate and moderate professor Zhou Gencheng of the Shanghai Institute of International Studies.
He explained that at present the intention was to maintain status quo on the border so that peace and stability prevail. He elaborated that the Treaties of Peace and Tranquility in 1993 and Confidence Building Measures in 1996 were designed to do just that and added the customary appendage of the border being ‘a legacy of history, very complicated and requiring time and patience’. So much for the optimists who are expecting a breakthrough.
Make no mistake: China will drag the border dispute at great cost to India till it feels it can impose a settlement on its terms and after the Dalai Lama has reached heaven. China has developed a deep and abiding interest in Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh (which it still calls South Tibet) which has become the sticking point in the border dispute. Privately, the Chinese are conveying that if India lets them retain Aksai Chin and Tawang, it will give up all other claims including Arunachal Pradesh. Tawang is important for China because the Khampa movement of the 1960s in Tibet had its roots here; tax records show Tawang as part of Tibet and a future revolt in Tibet could spring from Tawang.
India’s military preparedness is woefully inadequate and has remained virtually static for the last two decades except for some recent force accretions and infrastructure upgrades. Only a tiny part of the military enhancements recommended in 1988 are being implemented. Union Minister for Defence AK Antony admitted that we are lagging behind in modernisation. The Chinese are way ahead in their infrastructure and defence capabilities. That is why a Tawang grab or a Kargil-like skirmish have become possible.
But there is a simpler Confucian strategy to achieve the same objective: Keep India tied down to South Asia by prolonging the border dispute and encircling India. Beijing is back at playing its old game in the North- East by assisting Indian insurgent groups.
Yet, India’s conciliatory disposition and downplaying the China threat can be attributed to two reasons: A hangover of the 1962 defeat and avoidance of a two-front situation. New Delhi just does not have the resources for conventional deterrence on two fronts which is exacerbated by its No First Use nuclear policy whereas China’s No First Use is ambiguous over territory it claims.
India’s window of vulnerability has to be closed by other means which it has been shy of using so far. Vietnam, (which taught China a lesson in 1979 and since then the PLA has not fought a war), Taiwan and Tibet are low hanging force-multipliers. India should also activate other pressure points —off Malacca Straits and the Myanmar coast to buzz Chinese shipping. A belated start has been made in Hanoi. New Delhi must reclaim lost ground in Nepal and Sri Lanka and prevent further loss of influence to China.
Professor John Lee of Sydney University says that increased trade does not necessarily reduce tension; rather it deepens competition and rivalry in the long term. China cannot rise peacefully as other powers are also rising simultaneously. The geopolitical space is not large enough for the rise of any single power, without tension as last week’s East Asia Summit showed.
Managing China’s rise is not just India’s headache. It is a declining US’s primary concern — an America which is heavily indebted to Beijing and a China whose economy will overtake the former’s in 2020. At the same time, the US’s military spending will also have declined to its lowest level since 1940. Yet, the US is tipped to remain the number one smart power. To deal with China, India has to act like India.
Source: The Pioneer
Mr Singh has repeatedly said there is “enough space for the rise of both India and China”. But Beijing says that space is in certain areas of cooperation. Besides already becoming Air India’s Frequent Flier of 2011, Mr Singh, by his own admission, has met top Chinese leaders 28 times. That’s another record for any Indian Prime Minister.
Except for trade which is mainly to China’s advantage, there is little else to glow about. Chinese transgressions on the border continue. Their military buildup has outstripped our conventional deterrence. Beijing has quietly excised 2,000 km of the Ladakh border de facto trilateralising the bilateral Kashmir dispute.The India-China dispute is ready for entry in the Tussaud’s museum.
Numerically border negotiations have overtaken Mr Singh’s record meetings with Chinese leaders. Eight rounds from 1981 to 1987, 14 rounds from 1988 to 2001; 13 rounds since 2003 till the 14th dialogue between Special Representatives later this month. Both sides have sequentially toyed with ‘swap of territory’, delineation of Line of Actual Control and the ongoing political, economic and strategic dialogue.
India missed out on the swap deal in the 1960s. The Chinese backed off from exchange of maps fearing the LAC would become hostage to the presence of Indian troops. The current three-stage talks —agreement on political parameters, framework for delineation and the actual delineation — are deadlocked after China reneged on the agreement on not disturbing settled areas. Since then, only the two Special Representatives know what is going on. China has successfully diverted the border problem towards economic and strategic issues. The chimera of a breakthrough is posited even as Mr Singh repeatedly urges his interlocutors to expedite resolution of the border dispute.
A new joint mechanism for maintaining peace and tranquility on the un-demarcated LAC is in the offing even as China has quietly pushed troops into Gilgit-Baltistan, illegally excised from Pakistan Occupied Kashmir by Pakistan. The rationale for the glacial pace of border talks was confirmed last week at a seminar at New Delhi’s United Services Institution by the articulate and moderate professor Zhou Gencheng of the Shanghai Institute of International Studies.
He explained that at present the intention was to maintain status quo on the border so that peace and stability prevail. He elaborated that the Treaties of Peace and Tranquility in 1993 and Confidence Building Measures in 1996 were designed to do just that and added the customary appendage of the border being ‘a legacy of history, very complicated and requiring time and patience’. So much for the optimists who are expecting a breakthrough.
Make no mistake: China will drag the border dispute at great cost to India till it feels it can impose a settlement on its terms and after the Dalai Lama has reached heaven. China has developed a deep and abiding interest in Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh (which it still calls South Tibet) which has become the sticking point in the border dispute. Privately, the Chinese are conveying that if India lets them retain Aksai Chin and Tawang, it will give up all other claims including Arunachal Pradesh. Tawang is important for China because the Khampa movement of the 1960s in Tibet had its roots here; tax records show Tawang as part of Tibet and a future revolt in Tibet could spring from Tawang.
India’s military preparedness is woefully inadequate and has remained virtually static for the last two decades except for some recent force accretions and infrastructure upgrades. Only a tiny part of the military enhancements recommended in 1988 are being implemented. Union Minister for Defence AK Antony admitted that we are lagging behind in modernisation. The Chinese are way ahead in their infrastructure and defence capabilities. That is why a Tawang grab or a Kargil-like skirmish have become possible.
But there is a simpler Confucian strategy to achieve the same objective: Keep India tied down to South Asia by prolonging the border dispute and encircling India. Beijing is back at playing its old game in the North- East by assisting Indian insurgent groups.
Yet, India’s conciliatory disposition and downplaying the China threat can be attributed to two reasons: A hangover of the 1962 defeat and avoidance of a two-front situation. New Delhi just does not have the resources for conventional deterrence on two fronts which is exacerbated by its No First Use nuclear policy whereas China’s No First Use is ambiguous over territory it claims.
India’s window of vulnerability has to be closed by other means which it has been shy of using so far. Vietnam, (which taught China a lesson in 1979 and since then the PLA has not fought a war), Taiwan and Tibet are low hanging force-multipliers. India should also activate other pressure points —off Malacca Straits and the Myanmar coast to buzz Chinese shipping. A belated start has been made in Hanoi. New Delhi must reclaim lost ground in Nepal and Sri Lanka and prevent further loss of influence to China.
Professor John Lee of Sydney University says that increased trade does not necessarily reduce tension; rather it deepens competition and rivalry in the long term. China cannot rise peacefully as other powers are also rising simultaneously. The geopolitical space is not large enough for the rise of any single power, without tension as last week’s East Asia Summit showed.
Managing China’s rise is not just India’s headache. It is a declining US’s primary concern — an America which is heavily indebted to Beijing and a China whose economy will overtake the former’s in 2020. At the same time, the US’s military spending will also have declined to its lowest level since 1940. Yet, the US is tipped to remain the number one smart power. To deal with China, India has to act like India.
Source: The Pioneer
