Kashmir and Nagaland Ushers Indian Security Doctrine

Roviso Marza
University of Delhi

There are unavoidable areas comparable between Kashmir and Nagaland in the scope of viewing the Indian State, and more demanding of analysis when their controversial developments vividly reflects the depth of channelling India’s ‘constitutional vision.’ Flexibility of the Indian leaders pulling constitutional exercises in this regard invites their points of risk as well. Significantly, as speculated through the patterning waves of dialogue between the Indian government and the NSCN, chief negotiator of the Naga leadership, Th Muivah had accused Nagaland Governor and India’s interlocutor R.N. Ravi of spoiling the track of dialogue while semantically warning any civil group toeing  Ravi’s intent’ to be ‘anti-Naga.’ The Governor earlier voiced law and order failure in the state which then pulled up regulations much to the ire of the warring groups operating in the state. Virtually, there are identical security relations and governmental aspects linking the ‘Kashmiri-Naga’ resistances. It is understood that China was the common source of help, with outfits operating foreign bases. 

Ironically, the two states are strategic bastions for the Indian military, thereby drawing public uproar against the operation of Armed Force Special Powers Act. Taking the spell of politics however, ‘non-state actors’ like the ‘NSCN-Hurriyat’ dynamics engaging with an established state of India needs sleepless watch of the constitutional indicators, than to keep harking on the movements’ agenda. Their resistances are critically poised against the Indian Union espoused in their own notions of freedom respectively. Some observes their geographical distances and ethnic lifestyles as factors of aloofness with the Indian mainstream, coupled by socio-economic milieus; whereas, many argue that the repudiating attempts by Delhi to these imbalances hardens the gap. Hence, in many cases, the nature of resistance would tilt against what may be regarded as Delhi’s perceived negligence at resolution. Erstwhile Kashmir’s special provision in the Indian constitution can be seen now as an historical worth for Pakistan to re-ignite Kashmir above Delhi’s head, and where it was followed as a result of negotiating Kashmiri oppositions against the historical accession into the Indian Union. Similar record of the constitution shows considerable safeguards holding the state of Nagaland being constituted while dealing the Naga unrest not to join Indian Union, thus complicating Naga’s ancestral claims as existed prior to the British Raj. Undeniably for the Nagas facing post-independence, in their own stand, they are distinct from the rest of India on many respects, which commits for a settlement that necessarily strengthens the Naga habitation.

Interestingly, talks between the Naga leadership and the Centre had been clutched over a separate constitution and flag, among others, suitably making historical analogous to that of past Kashmir.

Normative setbacks of the talks would apparently instrument much against the ire of the outfits when complexities manifests for what governmental parameters thinks necessary of exercise. NSCN’s date with Delhi in this sense, can evidently expect a Kashmir-like model (highest autonomy in Indian history), and yet in future eventuality meet the same fate of witnessing another scene of ‘political-romancing-delusion.’ For reality check, the Indian constitution has problems seeing any governmental structure that threatens national integrity. Nehru evidently laid down the ‘Objectives Resolution’ ahead of independence to applying forced union and provinces. And until recently, Delhi’s growing taste of authoritarianism has had become less relevant for the government to get a state’s consent in finalizing ‘authoritative decisions.’

Justifiably enough, Delhi wanted a breather against customary restraint in a time when India needs commanding mandate for its burgeoning international prerogatives. Given India’s stake with these two ‘war-like’ movements, the implication heaps more critical questions whether the State can alter constitutional structures to answer these struggles, or if the movements should look for new strategies? Essentially for the Indian State gaining residuary powers behind the shades of nullifying these armed resistances, common grounds of governmental position against the struggling developments which threatens national integrity, it simply wags to pull up India’s security lines. In fact, viewing through India’s  normative conduct of government and politics, there need not be less ‘militant groups’ to lessen the scope of the Indian State security prisms; whereas on the other hand, the nature of channelling democratic contestations over these issues mooted up cohesion with the Indian State to play politics.

Whereas the advent of “Framework Agreement” tried to silence the long absence of a clear mechanism into the dialogues, sections of the people keep lamenting why the prospects of talks never involved the public domain transparently? To appreciate these critiques further raises questions as to what exactly should the people in general do in order to achieve their sense of freedom? Naga ‘societal behaviour’ apart from the Indian state paradigm, while heeding awry situations, easily gathers judgement against the NSCNs for spiralling mess, and crucially yet, makes more difficult for the ‘antagonist public’ to digest their versions of understanding the factional landscape. The triggered complexity feeds rather narrow perceptions of looking at the Naga movement – issues remain to deal seriously. Somewhat aborting these facts, the societal imbroglio makes durable pitfalls by way of hinging hypothetical mindscape into certain psyches of spilling down more narratives – which are but weak to match the breath of a complex movement and its implications. Unfortunately, for obvious reasons holding the Indian State against Naga’s ‘sickening thrives,’ the governmental attempts were usually simplified in resolving the issues and thus met with difficulties since they overlooked their complexities. Hence, while the insurgent groups engaging the Indian State link their struggles with instances of the past, the movements got infused as a result of the Indian State negligent approaches to their issues, thereby striking relevance with the negotiating roadblocks. The governmental attitude runs anyway critical when compared against the multifarious dimensions of issues driving the movements. In the public sphere, failed pursuits at resolution have cast doubt on the government’s sincerity towards these crises and thus threatened people’s security. Consequently, the assertion of rights intensifies when the situation became insecure, causing feelings of strengthening rights to go to extreme. Therefore, the inadequacy brought by the State, had suitably transposed the conflict to involve agents outside India. It would not be easy for the Indian State to diffuse these foreign bases which has possibly, taken strong holds. The repercussions are likely to create more tensions beyond boundary  lines for years ahead. Against this backdrop of the Indian State appraisal, the outcome of the Naga talks may differ with the principles agreed for solution. 

Nevertheless, in tip of concern, and to honour pragmatism in modern day politik, present Naga society can consider what the saying goes – “A bird in hand is worth two in bush,” and allow the negotiations a fair trial by clearing the air towards landing. There cannot be more pressing lessons for the Naga people to understand their paradoxical divisions of easily crediting and apprehending almost all efforts of the movement – it don’t take anywhere than only damage Naga’s inevitable place for unison as people. Naga situations thus crave on, deadly than wearisome, with uncontrollable trends of pillaring-up gaps within societies and organizations. Particular achievements of the individual groups wrestling Naga divides without lessening their degrees of separation, however glorifying, are seen rather non-committal for a strong Naga posterity, and one which inherently shapes crude shallow mindsets. Sadly, Naga’s noble account of simplicity penned down in several records to the outside world now appears to be a shameful ‘BIG LIE.’ Like it or not, the prospect of talks has painstakingly engineered grounds for next leaderships to follow, provided the Nagas can pay the price for a new ‘ailing journey.’