Speech of Bharat Bhushan during Seminar on “Accords and Agreements, Peace Processes and Prospects of Civil Society Peace Initiatives in the North East Region” on September 8 at Guwahati.
All of you know more about the problems of the North East than an outsider like me. That you have chosen to listen to an interloper like me is a matter of tremendous pride for me and I am thankful for this gesture by the organizers.
There are five parts to my presentation, so be prepared to be bored.
First, I will briefly trace how the Indian state deals with insurgencies and its strategies have changed over time.
Second, I will talk about cease-fire agreements and their political benefits.
Third, I will examine the role of civil society in sustaining cease-fires and peace processes and illustrate this with the example of the Nagas and the NSCN (IM).
Fourth, I will briefly delve into the possible misuses of prolonged cease-fire agreements.
And, lastly, I will talk about the pre-conditions for successful and unsuccessful peace accords.
Changing attitude of the Indian state to identity politics:
Despite taking public pride in the plurality and rich ethnic and cultural tapestry of the country, the Indian state has tended to see identity politics and the insurgencies it gives birth to as a threat to its unity and integrity. Suppression and political accommodation have been the two ends of a spectrum of strategies used by the Indian State to deal with such movements.
Each strategy reflects a certain notion of the State. Suppression carries within it the idea of a strong and unitary State, which takes its role as the sole repository of violence far too seriously.
The strategy of political accommodation premises itself on the notion of a State that is magnanimous and willing to move towards innovative and dynamic political structures. Political accommodation is not “pandering” but is a manifestation of the innate inclusiveness of democracy.
The State in India has not uniformly opted for military suppression in dealing with insurgencies. It may be the strategy of first choice in situations where the “battle” can be easily won. Such assessments have often been proved wrong. Yet suppression as a strategy of conflict resolution did succeed, although at considerable cost, in Punjab.
However, what cannot be denied is that over time there has been substantial political crafting and adaptation in the strategies used by the Indian State in dealing with insurgent groups. This is evident from the special Constitutional provisions for Kashmir under Article 370, the signing of the Kashmir Accord with Sheikh Abdullah in 1975, the carving out of new states from an undivided Assam, the slew of special provisions for the North Eastern states set out in Articles 371A, 371b and 371C, the creation of autonomous districts and hill councils and the Northeastern Council, the cease-fire and peace talks with the National Socialist Council of Nagaland as well as the suspension of operations agreement with the Karbis, Dimasas, Garos, Bodos and other groups in Tripura and elsewhere in the North East.
All these accords, agreements and processes may have their shortcomings. But what they indicate is a shift from using sheer force and suppression to political accommodation of insurgencies.
These strategies have evolved because there are limits to military suppression in dealing with insurgencies: there is fear of political alienation of the population, a need to maintain the integrity of the electoral process and democratic representation, the fear of civil society, and most importantly, the army and the paramilitary forces have often told the government that political problems require a political solution.
While there is a definite movement towards political accommodation of insurgencies through dialogue, the expectations of the State and the insurgent groups often differ from the peace process. These expectations get moderated thorough the process of cease-fire or suspension of operations against each other and the political dialogue they leads to. When a golden mean is reached in terms of each side’s expectations, a peace accord or settlement is signed. The question then is: how to get to that golden mean?
Ceasefire or Suspension of Operations (SOO) Agreements:
One of the first steps in dealing with an insurgency is to get its leaders to sign a cease-fire agreement or a Suspension of Operations (SOO) agreement. Such agreements have been signed by the government in the North East with the NSCN (Isak-Muivah) and the NSCN (Khaplang), the Achik National Volunteers’ Council (ANVC), the Nayan Bashi-led National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT-NB), the Dima Halam Daogah (DHD) of the Dimasas, the United Peoples Democratic Solidarity (UPDS) of the Karbis and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB). There are also some cautious overtures being made to the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) but they have not resulted in anything as yet.
While the agreements with the NSCN (IM) and (K) are called cease-fire agreements, all others are referred to as Agreed Ground Rules for Suspension of Operations.
The primary aim of these agreements is to reduce violence in the insurgency affected area by preventing the two sides from attacking each other. These agreements insist on certain ground rules to prevent recurrence of violence. Thus there is an agreement that the insurgent group’s cadre will stay in camps, that the cadres are prevented from moving about with arms or in uniform, that the insurgent outfit should not undertake any new recruitment and that it should refrain from extortion, etc.
In those cases where the demands of the insurgent group are within the Indian Constitution, these SOO agreements also bind the insurgent groups to respect the law of the land. A mutually agreed Joint Monitoring Group is also set up through these agreements to maintain the suspension of operations and monitor the adherence to ground rules.
It is important to understand what cease-fire and SOO agreements can achieve and what they cannot.
SOOs do not lead to demilitarization, peace accords do. SOOs only facilitate the implementation of ground rules for checking violence. Demilitarization through SOOs is something that even the insurgent groups do not expect. Often there are rival groups opposed to the peace process and the insurgent groups themselves may want the presence of security forces so that those opposed to the peace process do not gain ground control while they are confined to camps.
SOOs also do not mean a surrender of arms by the insurgent groups. Surrender of arms by the insurgents takes place as the last step in the peace process.
SOOs also do not mean acceptance of the insurgent group’s demands. So one should not have unrealistic expectations from a cease-fire or SOO agreement.
What then do SOOs achieve?
They are the first confidence building
measure between the two sides in conflict.
These agreements facilitate three important things:
1. They reduce mutual suspicion of the two sides and allowing them to reach the comfort level necessary for a dialogue.
2. They have a moderating influence over the underground rebels who are forced to become “reasonable” as they assess what is possible and what is not after interaction with the representatives of the State.
3. They allow the insurgent groups to involve larger population and body of opinion in the peace process as the cease-fire allows them to take the help of civil society and local intellectuals for peace.
Cease fire and SOO agreements help start a process of building trust which ultimately leads the underground leaders to begin thinking that their demands can be met through dialogue. Their initial negotiating positions may be unrealistic. They may begin with demanding complete sovereignty or a separate state. However, what is amazing is that once they choose the political path of dialogue, they continue talking even when sovereignty is ruled out or the difficulties associated with the formation of a separate state are pointed out to them.
The most crucial role in taking the peace process forward is played by the third and the largest party to the conflict – the civil society. Only if the civil society supports the peace process between the insurgents and the State, can the process be sustained. Otherwise it cannot survive.
SOO and cease-fire agreements provide the opportunity to insurgents to seek the opinion of civil society. This is evident in the way the All Bodo Students’ Union, the Bodo Sahitya Sabha, Bodo women’s organizations, etc. went with the peace process initiated with the Bodo Liberation Tigers. The civil society in Karbi Anglong is also encouraging the pro-talk faction of the UPDS to continue talking to the government. It is also no accident that the ULFA has to go through an Assamese intellectual and novelist in trying to assess the prospects of a peace process. And this is even before a cease-fire agreement has been signed.
What this shows is that there are three and not two parties to these conflicts – the State, the insurgent groups and the civil society. As a cease-fire or an SOO agreement is signed, the civil society assumes a supreme position – its approval or disapproval decides who is right – the underground or the State.
The civil society must, therefore, exercise its responsibility with great care and total integrity. It must oppose violence and must not have double standards. Killing of innocents, school children, innocent bus or train passengers, people going about their business by insurgents must not be judged using a different scale than the violence perpetrated by the security forces. Claiming that the killing of non-combatants in the case of the insurgents is only a mistake while in the case of the State it is repression will not do. The civil society cannot accept arguments for violence by insurgents with a nudge and wink and hope that its views on violence by the State would be taken seriously.
The civil society is like the judge before whom both sides are arguing their case on a day-to-day basis. Whichever side the civil society chooses is the winner because it holds the veto of peoples’ support from the beginning of the insurgency to the day a settlement or an accord is signed.
Role of civil society in the peace process – the Naga case:
In the case of the cease-fire between the NSCN (IM) and the government of India, one can venture to suggest that the biggest contribution in sustaining the peace process has been made by the Naga civil society organizations. In fact it has been a dialectical process – the civil society strengthening the peace process and the peace process in turn giving an unprecedented voice to the civil society. Today, Naga civil society organizations can criticize and give a direction to the peace process. A decade ago people would have been assassinated for being critical of the underground. Today that is no longer possible and the Naga solution is not even in sight. This has become possible because of the cease-fire and the cessation of violence.
When I met Thuingaleng Muivah recently I asked him whether there was any tension today between the Naga civil society and the NSCN (IM). I would like to quote his answer in full.
He said, “The basic principle that we belong to the people should never be overlooked. We operate in their name for the benefit of the nation. Without the people we have nothing. The involvement of the people therefore is most essential and eventually decisive.
“In the last seven years, the most pleasing thing that has happened is the growth of Naga civil society. New intellectuals, new voices have come up. They debate with us, often question us and make suggestions about how to move forward. I am not unhappy even when they are critical. In the ultimate analysis it is people who should decide their own fate.
“Through civil society I claim that we have understood people’s aspirations and their desire for peace better. In this way we are often made realistic in dealing with the people and the government of India.”
Here is an insurgent leader who has carried a gun for nearly five decades singing the praises not only of the critical opinion of the civil society but also of the moderating influence it has had on him and the NSCN. Would this have been possible a decade ago? I think not.
There is much that other insurgencies and civil society organizations in the North East can learn from the Nagas. For the first time there is recognition by the NSCN (IM) leadership that for the peace process to continue and for lasting peace itself, the approval of Naga civil society is necessary.
What has the NSCN (IM) done?
Setting aside its initial suspicions, it has encouraged two processes of peace making:
1. The consultation between the armed militants and the Naga and the non-Naga civil society organizations.
2. The dialogue between Naga civil society organizations, the Indian government and non-Naga civil society organizations.
Moving away from the phase of armed struggle, the NSCN (I-M) is now attempting not only to keep the Naga people informed of their negotiations but as its General Secretary Muivah put in an interview: “I asked the people for help -- to give us the benefit of their suggestions and criticisms so that we avoid making mistakes. After all we are responsible to the people and we can neither move ahead of them nor leave them behind.”
The civil society organizations playing a contributory role to peace making in Nagaland are primarily the Baptist Church, the Naga Peoples’ Movement for Human Rights, the Naga Mothers’ Organization, the Naga Hoho or the supreme tribal body, the Naga Students’ Federation and the tribal and state organizations of Nagas from Manipur, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh.
The Church orgnizations in Nagaland have been working for reconciliation among the various Naga factions. There has been so much fratricidal killing within the Nagas that unless there is reconciliation within Naga society, the peace process stands little chance of sustaining itself. The Church continues to make this effort although even the process of forming a reconciliation committee has seen some ups and downs lately.
The Naga Mothers’ Organization is another civil society group that has been meeting the underground groups in Bangkok and in Myanmar urging them to unite and seek durable peace with New Delhi. The Naga Mothers Organization has also been urging the United Naga Council of Manipur to seek reconciliation with the Meiteis.
There have been consultation between the Naga civil society organizations and the NSCN (I-M) in Bangkok and, earlier this year, even in Delhi and Dimapur. These consultations not only committed the NSCN (IM) leadership to greater transparency in the peace negotiations but also urged them to work for reconciliation within Naga society. A joint declaration by the civil society organizations gathered in Bangkok way back in 2001 emphasized “the need for deepening the healing, understanding and forgiving process in Naga society, traumatized and damaged physically, mentally and morally during the past decades of conflict and struggle.”
This was an important development. It sought to underpin the peace negotiations with the consent and support of Naga civil society. And this process of interaction between the leaders of the armed insurgency and the civil society is today a continuing process.
At least two dialogue processes have been organized between Naga civil society organizations and the Meitei intellectuals and organizations to make the dominant ethnic community of Manipur understand the Naga problem. They have not been very fruitful as yet but who knows, they might succeed one day.
Outside the state, several other organizations and individuals have been playing a peace building role. These include media organizations and human rights organizations such as “Other Media”, South Asian Forum for Human Rights. They have helped set up the Civil Society Initiative on the Naga Peace Process which has examined in detail the cease-fire and the allegations of its violations. These are good beginning and bode well for increasing the understanding between the Nagas and the rest of India.
Rita Manchanda’s study of Naga women’s role (“We do more because we can. Naga women in the peace process”) is a seminal work which records how women’s organizations have helped sustain the peace process. It has a memorable quote from Neidonuo Angami of the Naga Women’s Organization where she says,” Both sides can decide to break the cease-fire. But for whom after all are they talking – for us. We are all stakeholders in peace.”
He was not overstating the case. Lasting peace in Nagaland will come only if the peace process is backed by the civil society both in the Naga areas and outside it. What the Nagas have achieved is not only the involvement of their civil society but also of the civil society organizations in the rest of India which is gradually learning to appreciate the complexities of the Naga conflict and their desire for honourable peace.
Prolonged cease-fire agreements:
All this is fine but the picture would be incomplete unless one also examines the reverse side of the process and asks: What happens if a cease-fire is a prolonged one? Can it become counter-productive?
A cease-fire agreement is a means to an end. A delicate balance is needed between not hastening the pace of the peace process and making the cease-fire an end in itself. The process must not be hurried – enough time must be allowed to the insurgent groups to consult the people and take them along. If they don’t do that then whatever accord is signed will not find wide acceptance.
The cease-fire also needs to extend over a certain period of time for another reason -- For controlling rival factions opposed to the peace process as well as other political forces inimical to the peace process. This is an immense challenge and it should not be automatically assumed that everyone wants peace as there are vested interests in continuing the conflict also.
However, there is always a danger that once a cease-fire is declared people may forget what the magnitude of the conflict is – as its dimensions are no longer in focus. A prolonged cease-fire can create a false sense of “balance” in the situation. This an illusion and anyone who takes comfort in it is fooling himself.
A cease-fire or an SOO agreement must not, therefore, lead to complacency or be used as part of a deliberate wear-them-out strategy. If there is an opportunity to settle a conflict, then the State must seize the opportunity to resolve it.
A greater responsibility also devolves on the State because although the two parties to the conflict sign the cease-fire or SOO agreement as equal partners, this parity is illusory. The reality is that the State is the stronger force. The dialogue for cease-fire and the peace process itself becomes an unequal one – because whatever the insurgent leader says is a firm commitment and whatever the representative of the State says is subject to ratification. The “equality” in the partnership must, therefore, reflect in the mindset and conduct of the State’s emissaries.
Successful and unsuccessful accords:
Lastly a few words about what kind of accords succeed and which do not. I think there are some clear principles a successful accord must follow.
No accord that is based on the misconception that the insurgencies in India’s North East are about development or the lack of development can succeed. The lack of development can certainly breed an insurgency but people fight for justice and not for material gains. While nobody wants to die in vain, no one dies for a swimming pool in his house or for three bedroom bungalows instead of a thatched hut. Rebels tend to have bigger causes. They are related to a sense of injustice, wanting control over the destiny of their people and finding better ways of fashioning and administering their future according to their own genius.
Only those accords succeed which identify the real underlying causes of the insurgency. Thus no accord with the Nagas can succeed which denies them the right to decide their own future or explore the possibility of living in a single political unit instead of being spread over four states of India. The Assamese may not like it but the Bodos and the Karbis may still feel done down by the policies of Guwahati, just as the Assamese may harbour feelings of injustice against New Delhi. The point is that it is important to address the sense of injustice rather than throw money at the problem in the name of development.
If the foundation of an accord is dishonest, then no matter how it is worded, it cannot succeed. Any accord in which a word or a sentence is subject to two different meanings or interpretations also cannot work. The Akbar Hyderi Accord singed with the Nagas in June 1947, two months before Indian Independence, is a case in point. It was a fraudulent document meant to cheat the Nagas. So it did not work.
Every settlement or an accord has to be a document of self-respect and cannot be one-sided. The Shillong Accord is dishonest because it is one sided – the Nagas were expected to surrender their weapons and the State only accepted the surrender. Such an accord cannot survive. An insurgency is not made of weapons but of wounded self-respect and a deep sense of injustice.
An accord or a settlement is also not signed with the leader of an insurgent group. It is signed to satisfy the sentiments of the cadre of the insurgent group. If their sentiments are not satisfied, immediately a new insurgency begins. Even the ink does not have to dry for this to happen. We have seen this time and again in the North East.
Accords in which the real leaders are kept out also cannot work. The State often tries to create groups that would surrender with much fanfare and accept rehabilitation packages but the insurgency continues with the same ferocity as earlier. Those who want to give up violence must of course be encouraged to do so and enabled to do so. However, we have seen how in some parts of India fake surrenders have become a business.
An accord in which the manner of surrender of weapons is not honourable will not work nor would an accord that does not have a long-term vision about the rehabilitation of insurgent cadre. The longevity of an accord is determined by how a society treats its surrendered militants.
Finally, it is also wrong to suggest that peace accords favour only one side. If only one side gains then there would be no accord. A peace accord is only a partial accomplishment of the objectives that the insurgent group fights for – it is a political compromise. In a democracy, honourable political compromises are not bad. They are in fact desirable. Peace accords and cease-fires are attempts at finding these acceptable compromises.
(The writer is Editor of The Telegraph in Delhi)
