A day after the 1997 ceasefire came into effect, the Economic & Political Weekly (EPW) (02 August 1997, Vol 32, Issue No. 31), explained that the path to peace would be thorny and challenging. The article entitled Long Road to Peace in Nagaland cited three hurdles in the way of settlement. First, it said, “the intelligence agencies appear to be against any peaceful solution, as they have developed a stake in the continuing armed conflict in Nagaland and Manipur by creating and training a large number of protégés,” who in the event of peace would become unemployed. Second, a section in the Nagaland State Government, both “Naga and non-Naga politicians and officials,” is reportedly opposed to any concession since they prospered from the status quo. Third, the division and mutual animosities within the “Naga under-ground” has created a factionalized society, often fanned by interest groups and agencies.
In hindsight, given the present context, EPW’s article was critical and should have generated dialogue on the imperative of addressing the concerns it raised. However, at that time, the article lost traction to euphoria of the ceasefire as people welcomed the peace with a sense of relief and expectation. Democratic space opened and Nagas could interact and participate more freely by connecting to each other and with the outside world. In the beginning it created a glowing picture as the context of relative peace reduced violence and ushered economic activities. Slowly, over time, the ceasefire fostered new dynamics of political expediency, power centres were created, and unabated taxation and systemic corruption reached new levels, civil society fragmented, and Naga issue reduced to factions. The conflict fatigue accumulated over the years started to manifest itself in unhealthy ways.
The ceasefire experience shows us that mere absence of violence is not peace. A template that is intended to only end the violence without addressing the root causes of why it occurred in the first place will not lead to an enduring peace.
The Hindustan Times editorial entitled Sustain the Naga Peace Talks on August 26, 2020, provides an insight to the template. The editorial says, “The Indian State has a novel way of dealing with what seem to be intractable armed conflicts. Engage (with stakeholders, including rebels); assert (the State’s authority) and coerce; divide (especially rebel groups which are often prone to fragmentation); concede (but only partially, without compromising on core principles); and repeat the cycle.” This template, it says, “helps ensure peace without concessions, maintains the centrality of the State, and either weakens rebel groups or creates incentives for them to stay within the framework of a peace agreement.”
Perhaps the 16 Point Agreement, 1960 and the Shillong Accord, 1975 are products of this template. Ironically, Marcus Franke informs us that Reverend Michael Scott, who headed the Nagaland Peace Mission, “came to the conclusion that the Indian elite did not negotiate to come to any real result but to win time, to divide and rule, as imperialists do.”
For sustainable and enduring peace to prevail, a new template with a vision is imperative. It must shift away from being a dogmatic, bureaucratic, hawkish, coercive, manipulative, divisive, patronizing, and monocultural process. And move towards an intercultural, embracing, engaging, trusting, political, ethical, respectful, and moral progress of the principle of a common and shared humanity.
In essence, a template that unites and partners in addressing the root causes of the issue and engaging it on the principles of justice and rights of all peoples. Invariably only a strong democratic India can muster the courage to develop such a new template for lasting peace. The question is, does she have the vision to exercise political will and prudence?
