
Aheli Moitra
A recent piece written for The Asian Age attempts to warm the Look East Policy (LEP) egg but lands up poaching it. It puts together data produced by the likes of South Asia Terrorism Portal, touts flawed understanding of the Naga movement as “terrorism” in general and advices the Government of India to curb “terrorism” in the North East for the successful implementation of the LEP. It classifies all of Manipur’s armed groups as terrorist groups. Pandering to national taste for information, the article beats the Chinese and Pakistan’s ISI drums as though “external” threats amalgamating with “internal” ones are the threat to India expansion east. As though resolving this external nation-based threat could cure what ails the people of the region that has apparently nothing to do with India’s 60 years of policy-making for the North East.
The article completely ignores the fact that armed violence has exponentially risen since India was handed over the affairs of the region. It assumes the basis of the LEP to be legitimate, and applies a blanket “terrorism” model—it reeks of deliberate ignorance of the aspirations of the people of the region, and intends to frame it all as criminal enterprise.
With advice like this, it is no wonder that a solution to the Naga political issue has remained evasive.
The LEP, they say, was proposed a long time back, in 1994 by India’s liberalisation man, P. V. Narasimha Rao—its ideational frameworks found in Nehru. It seeks to open up trade, commerce and eventual cultural and political relations between nations of South East Asia (as well as Australia) and India. No doubt, it seeks to counter China’s growing influence in Burma and beyond; to break the “mongoloid barrier” of its east, establish a hold over markets that the Chinese are currently flooding, enhance India’s GDP points and become an Asian heavyweight.
The Chinese influence, at the moment, is at an all time low. Its aggressive investment policy in Burma has made many people turn their backs. Instead of using this critical moment to resolve the Naga political issue and switch gears, India has high-jumped the North East and continued to seduce Burma to take advantage of the situation—while the US will not make aggressive moves (that threaten India or China) and use “aid” instead to infiltrate Burma, India continues to fund projects in Burma that will benefit the people of India in no direct way. The Tamanthi Dam Hydro Project, Kaladan Multi-modal Transit (Unnecessary) Transport Project, numerous road, port and energy projects exemplify this.
In all these projects, India has forgotten to engage the East. The North East seems troublesome due to the lack of this. While Neiphiu Rio is a good partner in this engagement, putting together unfinished roads through the Naga areas of India and Burma, it will be an incomplete engagement if the Naga movement and the people it will affect are looked on as “terrorists”. And though bureaucrats and politicians directly in conversation with the Nagas since 1997 might not go by this theory, it is important for them to affect public perception of the peoples’ aspirations and movements in the North East region. India should not look at the LEP as a means to simply exert authority and hegemony over the region, as there will always be someone to counter it better, but to empower the people here.
If it is the people who have hindered India’s entrance into South East Asia, a partnership with people by providing a platform for political self-determination could open up possibilities for India in a way that could foster peace and prosperity for all parties concerned. Instead of high-jumping the Nagas and diving into the complexity of the economics of Burma, India should first try to engage equitably the people located at the most important juncture of its Look East Policy, in North East India and North West Burma.
For feedback and ideas, write to the author at moitramail@yahoo.com