Aheli Moitra
Earlier this month, the Government in New Delhi approved a Rs. 11,000 crore-project for the modernization of central paramilitary forces. The latter include the CRPF, BSF, ITBP, CISF, SSB, NSG and the Assam Rifles. The modernization seeks to ensure, apart from the scams the money will attract, better arms and ammunition, night vision devices, patrolling equipment, vehicles….wait, more patrolling equipment?
The Assam Rifles (AR), bestowed with the responsibility to manage India’s “counter insurgency operations” in the Indo-Myanmar border, put its large foot into its large mouth last week by harassing three citizens of Kiphire town while “patrolling”. This was preceded, suggested locals, by several months of rigorous clamp-down on the freedom people in Kiphire should enjoy— mobile phones, personal diaries, reminder notes on palms—everything was checked. Of course such action against civilians is bound to fail but the bigger question is: have the AR lost the psychological war through its “winning hearts and minds” (lovingly known as WHAM) campaign too?
For some years now, the AR have opened orphanages, inaugurated water supply schemes, distributed solar street lights and seeds, computers and mushrooms, provided vocational training, sponsored excursions, donated blood, alcohol and chairs to the needy. All of this is part of the ‘psychological operations’ (Psy Ops) of the Indian army and its associated formations, meant to counter “insurgencies” within India, and undermine popular uprising. The seemingly beneficial deeds of giving material goods/development are done under the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958. If you choose not to allow them in with their computers, thus, they still reserve the right to shoot you if the sight does not please.
India’s Counter-Insurgency Doctrine was broadly laid out through the experience of its armed forces in the Naga and Mizo areas in the 1950s and 60s. It became clear to the military only in the 1980s that using brutal force on people will not work. In 2006, a document by the name Doctrine for Sub-Conventional Operations was released by the Indian army that shifted the army’s focus to “conflict management”, understood colloquially as “winning hearts and minds” or “iron fist, velvet glove”. The doctrine was a strategic shift from tackling “low intensity conflict” (through the end of the last century and start of this) to tackling whole populations.
WHAM textbooks suggest the subjugation of peoples with love, or minimal use of force. Psychological manipulation, through the distribution of “goodwill” articles, is considered legitimate. Yet, after years of this manipulation, an aberration and a Kiphire breaks out. This is because such strategies keep little of peace and more of the ammunition-loaded concept of security in mind.
There is no talk of resolution, and instead of “aiding civil power”, the Indian armed forces are now protecting and preserving their image in the Naga areas (and the rest of North East and Kashmir).
Conflict management, institutionalization and legitimization of the Army (and armed violence) do not make only for alienation and anger, but also mark the difference between the right to life and none of it. They undermine political negotiations, and deliberately create a society devoid of trust and optimism. If WHAM has not worked, it is because people experience psychological burdens of “counter-insurgency” ops, and react when fissures form.
New Delhi need not sanction Rs. 11,000 crore for the modernization of this line of thought. It had rather spend its money on bringing a paradigm shift in the way it thinks of peoples in the region; not as insurgents or people to be psychologically bought but as communities waiting to cooperate and collaborate with their neighbourhood. This could be done best by using peoples’ frameworks to peace and development, instead of applying experiences of those trained in war.
For feedback and ideas, write to the author at moitramail@yahoo.com
