In the Telegraph, Kolkata recent reports have published talks of an ‘interim government’ in Nagaland state. Insurgent group, NSCN-IM and the centre government have been talking and trying to come to an understanding which may ultimately result in an ‘interim government’ for the state for a period of years. The sources said NSCN-IM had originally sought for a 15-year interim arrangement but the centre has instead proposed a 5-7 year interim period considering 15 years arrangement too long. Chief principal secretary of the Government of the People’s Republic of Nagaland (GPRN) of the NSCN-IM, Samson Jojo, has said that no timeframe has been set as yet but that he was optimistic the interim agreement would be signed soon. Telegraph further reports that the Centre and NSCN-IM “had agreed on joint military and foreign affairs, common currency and a separate flag for Nagalim (land of Nagas), which would indicate shared sovereignty with India.” Although land and resources, period of interim agreement and depositing of over 15,000 strong Naga army and arms have not been finalized, NSCN (I-M) has refused to deposit the weapons during the interim period as that would be ‘tantamount to surrender.’ It is believed they would most likely sign a 32-point interim government which may result in the creation of five administrative zones.
S.C. Jamir, also member of the Northeast Congress Coordination Committee, had commented: “For elections, we need peaceful conditions. How can we handle insurgency? We want it settled before elections. It (talks with NSCN-IM) has been continuing for 15 years and people are fed up.” But would the interim arrangement, stepping down of the state government mean President’s rule- a small reminisce of 75’s Emergency too perhaps? No, Jamir argues, citing Mizoram as an example where Lalthanhawla had resigned for MNF’s (Mizoram National Front) chief Laldenga who became the interim chief minister in his place –whom was later toppled by defections in the office followed by President’s rule and then Lalthanhawla again in 1989. Jamir has also said that they had highlighted “the social, political and geographical importance of northeastern states and the need develop it speedily to the high command. The central government is also in a hurry to settle a solution before the polls for the political leadership to get the Congress back in power, as quoted by them, while still having reservations about reaching a final settlement. Other reports other than the Telegraph have also commented that the present government would like the Naga political issue to be settled before the Assembly elections in Nagaland scheduled March, 2013.
The loopholes
Reading through these reports only one faction is being consulted and on-going talks centered more or less mostly around them. What would this result in? More conflicts between the various factions who are ‘left out’ and resulting in more strained relations whether with the centre government or among themselves? Another questions asks whether the problem of the ‘Naga political issue’ can be easily settled by this interim arrangement or talks with just one underground faction in Nagaland. Shouldn’t all factions be equally consulted if a collective agreement for peace/stability or collaboration with the Indian state is to be awarded within the state? That was the case in Mizoram with the MNF (who were a united front without defections or factions within). In the case of Naga insurgency groups, there are different factions who have defected from the main body, and also sometimes led to further defections within themselves too. If a joint agreement with all the factions within the underground movement, or secessionist movement is not reached what sort of solution would that bring for the political issue? A half-done solution, or even a more violent upsurge in its wake?
The other matter is that everything is being done in a hurry. This solution hopes to come into action, i.e. the interim government, by October this very year 2012. Before the Assembly elections, so Congress can come back to power, for a “social, political and geographical importance of northeastern states” to make haste and develop for the ‘Look East Policy’? Are these reasonable enough criterions to settle sensitive and delicate insurgent issues that the Nagas, including the whole of N.E, are engulfed in? Also, the ‘Look East Policy’ could bring more tribulations for the region by increased insurgent activities or commercialization and exploitation of the land. Why are we in such a hurry, and in that wake, why is the public not notified about the developments in Delhi? The agreements are conducted in closed-meetings and the information received is very obscure and vague. In fact, none of the local newspapers have not able to relay reliable and concrete information still. Where is the place of the public in this? We are not sure what the interim government will impose, whether it will subsequently lead to President’s rule like in Mizoram if the contending parties are all not satisfied by October.
The North-east Syndrome
Insurgency in the North-east is ubiquitous. Even Arunachal Pradesh has emerged with an insurgent rebel group very recently. The South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) in 2006 counted 109 rebel groups in North-east India –Arunachal had not joined in then. The reason for insurgency or ‘secessionist’ movements are many, also surfacing because of historical and ethnicity dissimilarities, not forgetting cultural differences too. Whichever the case, one can almost predict that insurgent movements in N.E are here to stay. One pattern in the north-east is how when an accord is signed with a certain ‘rebel group’ another one comes up in its place to assert the same rights which had temporarily faded into oblivion by the signing of one insurgent movement. Like in Tripura, Manipur, or even Nagaland. This is also a creation of India’s divide and rule policy, not excluding differential treatments which have resulted in proliferation of more insurgent groups as they try to ‘nationalize’ politics in the N.E. Another aspect is ‘ethnic insurgency’ within a state. This is the case with Mizoram itself when MNF diluted into the state government smaller ethnic groups like the Brus (BNLF) and the Hmars (HPC) resorted to armed struggle to gain autonomous district councils for themselves like the Lais, the Maras or the Chakmas. In fact, hardly a year into Mizoram’s statehood Hmars waged their armed struggle for autonomous district council.
Is this a solution for the state that can hold and bring results? Why does it seemingly project very doubtful premonitions? How can it be done in a swoop of a broom and a dustpan or are there ulterior motives for a political party, centre government without the public in the centre focus? More than politicians, insurgent groups or the centre government even who is tucked away in the capital far away from us, WE- the public are exasperated and always at the receiving of whichever force governs the land. So, we, the public need justice or a proper settlement headed our way which may benefit us, and not the titular heads who may project our voices as though it is their own.
