Union Minister of State for Programme Implementation and Statistics, and the leader of the Prime Minister’s Ministerial team on Indo-Naga peace talks, Oscar Fernandes, not surprisingly chose to remain hush-hush from disclosing the nitty-gritty of the talk’s outcome with the NSCN-IM, stating that he would not do so unless a final deal was struck. The ‘gravity of the situation’ (whatever that means) has been given as one of the reasons why the results of the talks could not be disclosed. It is therefore obvious that Oscar’s visit though extremely crucial was intended to be an exercise aimed to feel the pulse of the people and get opinion from a cross section of the people. Whether or not the opinion that he will carry back to Delhi is as broad-based and representative as it ought to be, Oscar’s visit nevertheless should be strong reminder that the Naga people themselves would have to be prepared to deal with the political situation arising out of any settlement, interim or otherwise.
Going by what is emanating from the lips of those who matter such as Oscar Fernandes or Chief Minister Neiphiu Rio, both of them now using the term ‘step-by-step’ process with more regularity; it does appear that a one-time-all-inclusive settlement does not look like taking place. At least this fact appears clear given the public statement made on the viability of having an interim agreement that will allow both parties in taking measured steps that allows forward movement of the peace process. Rio’s contention that an interim agreement will help in preventing the process from breaking down therefore has its own logic and is a good point of argument.
However the problem with Rio’s formulation is that unless there is proper assurance from Delhi, the Naga people should be careful not to sign another document like the Hydari or Nine-point agreement of 1947. To quickly recap, the Nagas demanded an Interim Government for a period of ten years and self-determination there after. Assam Governor Sir Akbar Hydari came to Kohima to solve the Naga political problem and he pro-posed and submitted a plan for the “10 Years agreement” (“Nine-Point or Hydari Agreement”). The NNC agreed with modification for the self-determination at the end of this period (the ninth point). However, Hydari’s nine-point agreement signed with the NNC in June 1947 fell flat, as its last article was contentious. It was in fact a betrayal of the Nagas.
It will therefore require that external guarantors are identified and brought in if at all an interim agreement is being mooted. About the mechanism of an external guarantor, it is globally practiced that once you come to an agreement third parties are brought in to act as a guarantor so that the accord arrived at between two parties is implemented fully. An interim agreement without external guarantors is therefore not advisable. While a phase wise formula as the general contours of a political settlement looks imminent, the next crucial challenge for the State political leadership and the Naga civil society groups will be to sell the formulation to the other national groups and get a broad-based support of the public for the agreement to be both workable and to have legitimacy in the eyes of the people.
