The recommendation put forward by the DMK led Tamil Nadu government to the Centre asking the latter to re-write the Indian Constitution afresh comes against the backdrop of the Supreme Court verdict on the 9th Schedule, which apparently made all laws open to judicial scrutiny. Given that Tamil Nadu has 69 per cent reservations for SCs and STs in the state, which is now open to judicial debate, the intentions of the State government is obvious—give more powers to implement policies suited to the States. Such an argument demanding State’s rights over policy matters affecting an individual State cannot be brushed aside even by the ideologues supporting a strong Centre. The recent decision taken by the Nagaland Legislative Assembly setting up a Committee to look into all aspects of law passed by Parliament vis-à-vis Article 371 (A) should also be seen in this light.
The problem has to be understood in its proper context of Centre-State relations and what the Constitution itself has to say about the division of powers. While as much as the issue is highly contentious in nature, it also requires active discussion involving academicians, legal experts, and policy makers etc. to arrive at the best practicable position of what constitutes State’s rights without contravening on national interest and likewise how the Centre can govern in national interest without being indicted of malafide intentions. The fathers of the Indian Constitution were well aware of the two opposing currents and although the Constitution clearly mentions India to be a federal system, enough leeway was written into the statute book to allow the growth of a dominant Centre. The result has been the clear emergence of what has come to be known as a ‘quasi-federal system’ in which the Centre’s Sword of Damocles hangs over State autonomy in the Indian Union.
Several examples can be given, which makes it clear that there are some striking unitary features as far as the position of States in the so called Indian Federation is concerned. For instance the residuary powers are reserved to the States by the American system but are assigned to the Centre by the Indian Constitution. Further in matters of amendment of the constitution, again the part assigned to the State is minor as compared with that of the Centre. Except in few specified matters affecting the federal structure, the States need not even be consulted in matters of amendment. There are also provisions for the control by the Centre both over the administration and legislation of the States. Apart from emergencies, Parliament may also assume legislative power over any subject included in the State list.
A proper assessment of the federal scheme introduced by the Constitution is that it introduces a system which is to normally work as a federal system but there are provisions for converting it into a unitary or quasi-federal system. It is therefore clear that there is an obvious bias in favor of the Centre at the expense of State rights. Such demands whether of Tamil Nadu or Nagaland is therefore perfectly legitimate for a proper balance in the working of the federal system. The desire for more State powers should not be merely brushed off as secessionist or anti-national but rather due attention must be given in order to ensure a healthy relation as also to strengthen mutual trust between the Centre and the numerous States making up the Indian Union.
