Ngaranmi Shimray
New Delhi
The proposed arrangement under the Frontier Nagaland Territorial Authority (FNTA) raises an important question: what problem is it intended to solve? If the objective is to address the long-standing developmental and infrastructure deficits of Eastern Nagaland, then the proposed solution appears unnecessarily complicated and constitutionally problematic.
Nagaland already enjoys one of the most unique constitutional protections in India. Article 371A provides:
“Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, no Act of Parliament in respect of religious or social practices of the Nagas, Naga customary law and procedure, administration of civil and criminal justice involving decisions according to Naga customary law, ownership and transfer of land and its resources, shall apply to the State of Nagaland unless the Legislative Assembly of Nagaland by a resolution so decides.”
No other State enjoys such a comprehensive constitutional safeguard. Only Mizoram, under Article 371G, has a similar provision, although it does not extend to “land and its resources.”
Because of Article 371A, Naga villages continue to govern themselves according to their customary institutions and traditional practices. Some customary laws have been codified, while many continue to be followed in their traditional form. Consequently, there is little practical need for a separate legislative structure to protect customary governance in Eastern Nagaland. That protection already exists.
The demand raised by the Eastern Nagaland People’s Organisation (ENPO) has primarily centred on the region’s economic backwardness and inadequate infrastructure. These are genuine concerns that deserve serious attention. However, developmental deficiencies are best addressed through developmental solutions rather than constitutional experimentation.
A more practical approach would be for the Government of India in consultation with other stakeholders to formulate a comprehensive socio-economic and infrastructure development programme for Eastern Nagaland, fully funded by the Centre over a period of ten to twenty years. The objective should be to bridge the developmental gap and bring the region on par with, or even ahead of, the rest of Nagaland.
For effective implementation, a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) could be established. The SPV should include representatives of the concerned departments of the Government of Nagaland, local village institutions, and elected representatives. Such an arrangement would provide dedicated project management while ensuring coordination with the existing administrative machinery.
Once completed, every infrastructure asset created under the programme should be transferred to the concerned line department of the State Government for operation and maintenance. The departments would identify the additional manpower required, obtain approval for creation of posts, and assume responsibility for managing the assets.
The recurring expenditure on salaries, operation, and maintenance should be adequately reflected in future Finance Commission awards. Where necessary, suitable provisions may also be made for additional grants during the transition period. This would strengthen existing institutions rather than creating parallel administrative structures.
Some have suggested granting Eastern Nagaland autonomous district councils similar to those operating under the Sixth Schedule in Meghalaya or a territorial council like the Bodoland Territorial Council. If legislative autonomy is considered necessary as already given to the ADCs and TC on specified subjects, constitutional mechanisms already exist through Articles 244 and 244A and the Sixth Schedule. There is therefore no need to invent an entirely new institutional model.
Even this option, however, deserves careful consideration. Extending Sixth Schedule-type legislative powers into Nagaland could unintentionally dilute the existing constitutional framework under Article 371A. Since customary governance including resources is already protected and legislative functions for the State are exercised by the Nagaland Legislative Assembly, creating another legislative authority may produce overlapping jurisdictions, administrative confusion, and avoidable constitutional disputes.
Unless the objective is eventual statehood for Eastern Nagaland, there appears to be little justification for establishing an additional law-making body. The challenge before Eastern Nagaland is fundamentally developmental, not legislative.
If preserving the territorial integrity of Nagaland remains the common objective, then the emphasis should be on accelerating development rather than multiplying institutions. A well-funded SPV dedicated to socio-economic transformation, combined with integration through the existing State departments, would provide a simpler, constitutionally sound and administratively efficient solution.
The creation of new infrastructure would naturally warrant additional government posts. Recruitment policies could legitimately provide appropriate preference and weightage to qualified local youth from Eastern Nagaland, thereby ensuring that the benefits of development are shared by the communities for whom the programme is intended.
The broader Naga political issue, currently in a stalemate, has already become sufficiently complex. Introducing an institutional arrangement whose constitutional validity is likely to be questioned may only complicate matters further during implementation. If the real objective is to eliminate regional disparities, the focus should remain on sustained investment, effective implementation, and stronger public institutions, not on creating parallel legislative structures whose necessity has yet to be convincingly established and adds another complication to the Naga political issue.
