From cold war to hot peace?
Akum Longchari and Babu Ayindo
Towards Hot Peace?
There is no turning back…we will win. We are winning because ours is a revolution of mind and heart – Caesar Chavez
Two critical issues that conflict resolution a la Western culture theorists and practitioners hardly acknowledge is the history of the field and the idea of what is termed civil society. First, it is rarely stated that human history is primarily about encounter with conflict: conflict with fellow humans and the institutions they create; nature; and the world beyond. And, more importantly, all cultures are a process and product of this encounter with conflict. Like liberal democracy, conflict resolution is presented as a new, universal, social science initiative, which any “civilized” person should accept.
As an academic discipline, conflict resolution western culture is an outgrowth of democratic liberalism. Emerging from the 18th and 19th century discontent with monarchies, democratic liberalism searched for an alternative ideology that would fulfill the aspirations of the emerging nation-states following the treaty of Westphalia in 1648.
Though the State would be able to exercise authority even by use of force, the citizens would control the State. This was regarded as a pragmatic response to the dictatorial tendencies of the monarchy. Conflict Resolution draws from democratic liberalism, if with a little creativity, for as Allan Tidwell notes:
what [m]odern conflict resolution has done is to replace many of the explanations of behavior such as the desire for life and liberty, with other motivations. For example, instead of arguing that people are motivated by the pursuit for life and liberty, Burton has argued that individuals are motivated by our of needs satisfaction […] Regardless of the motivation held, many of the objectives of conflict resolution remain as those in democratic liberalism.
The focus of liberal democracy is the individual not the collective. Individual needs and convenience overrides the collective aspirations, self-determination and values. This very same logic functions in the “universalized” conflict resolution. Because Conflict Resolution assumes that the State is a neutral institution, or at least derived for the common good, there is a tendency to take the forces of State for granted. In so doing, the field does not address issues of structural violence and structural illegitimacy -- the very source of violence and conflicts in most of third and fourth worlds. It promotes the idea that prosperity and the development of the individual is the strongest foundation of peace.
To a large degree Peacebuilding has followed the patterns of State-building. And here lies a fundamental irony: Max Weber’s assertion that the State possesses the monopoly of the legitimate use of force is borne by experience. Violence is central to the nature of the State. Ali A. Mazrui stretches the argument: “[t]he global system on nation-states has in turn been a structure of repressed international violence.” Now, if conflict resolution is founded on the same ideal as those of State building and, if the State is fundamentally an instrument of structural violence, does it not follow that Peacebuilding is predicated on ideals of violence?
Someone once defined the state as a group of people bound by a common misconception of their origin and a unified hatred for their neighbor. Having lived with the State and global hegemony for almost 300 years, not only have we been accustomed to believe that both are the only way of social organization, but we have also forgotten where we have come from. We tend to forget the philosophical underpinnings of social organization of our nations [the so called tribes]. Rarely do we see the State -- as a social organization -- as a problem by itself. And, in recent times we have gone further: according to Hoffman, democracy is presented as nothing than the State itself. We are afraid to face the reality that the “modern” Westphalian State hardly respects the aspirations of nations and people that preceded it. We are afraid to believe that the fragility of the global structure of nation-state makes it easier for a few people to exercise the culture of power through the control of instruments of violence and the production and consumption behavior patterns of the whole world.
Second, it is hardly stated that the idea of civil society, which champions Conflict Resolution work, has its roots in the European intellectual tradition and western political culture. This concept is yoked together with the idea of the Westaphalian nation-state. As James Mittelman has noted, civil society “is regarded as that realm of associational life above the individual - or, some would say, the family - and below the state.” More importantly, [t]he idea of civil society has been imported into the politics of globalization partly because of neoliberalism’s lack of philosophical dimension and also partly because of multiple signs of disintegration of social order.”
If we accept these arguments, therefore, when John Paul Lederach talks of a “middle out” approach he is basically affirming the ideology of the civil society. In other words, he would like to see changes happen but within the realm of the existing nation-state. In this regard, statist diplomacy and alternative dispute resolution methods are heading towards the same destination: a situation of social order and not necessarily of justpeace. We shall return to this discussion presently.
Further, many conflict resolution organizations are structured along the pattern of the nation-states. Though they preach democracy, openness and accountability, the reality is that many have centralized authoritarian leadership structures. Like third world governments, their ancestors reside in Western capitals. Hardly are they accountable to the people they purport to serve. Like the State, peacebuilding organizations operate like oligarchies unable to enhance the much-needed dialogue. One gets the feeling that if NGOs were to possess instruments of physical force they would be transformed into a replica of the State.
Yet, in most of third world, conflict resolution work is engineered by Non-Governmental Organizations [NGOs]. Many models favor and advocate intervention by the middle. In the last decade, donors seem to have chosen to channel more of their resources through NGOs as State apparatuses have become more corrupt and unreliable. Consequently, this group of society has become a reliable conduit not just for donor aid but also for Western consumerism and cultural domination. However, if we seek to attain anything sustainable, anyone who has worked with NGOs in third and fourth worlds would advice you to rather remain faithful to the State. The reality, as columnist John Githongo writes, is that, [m]any of today’s NGOs can never be sustainable and independent because of their dependence on donor funds that are dished out by agents serving the interests of mainly Western governments. These governments have specific agendas and when agendas change NGOs have to change or find themselves starved of funds. Today it’s gender, then environment, then governance, then human rights, corruption, then decentralization and conflict resolution.
The cultural mode of peacebuilding agendas is determined in Western capitals. In fact, the NGOs are more accountable to their donors than their own people or governments. On the other hand, when International NGOs enter areas of conflict in third and fourth world nations, little effort is made to “inculturate” their structures and operations. They maintain their perceived set of assumptions and prejudices and are, therefore, unable to constructively address the core issues of the political, social and economic conflicts. One of the “theoretical” assumptions they make, as Graham Hancock in the Lords of Poverty would say, is that third world people are a helpless lot, capable of nothing. Not only do they need compassion -- that apparently is in abundance in the West -- but also intellectual and moral leadership.
It is in this spirit that we wish to examine in more detail a model now widely being adopted in the third and fourth worlds. Developed by our professor John Paul Lederach, the model conceptualizes “leadership in a population affected by conflict” in the form of a pyramid and categorizes key actors in conflict into three, namely, top [the smallest], middle and bottom [the largest]. He further posits that because the middle level is not desperately involved in survival activities, and since they have connections and respect between the top and bottom, they are best suited to initiate and co-ordinate Peacebuilding programs. He proposes that Peacebuilding take a well coordinated multi-level “middle out” approach both vertically and horizontally. Indeed, he proposes a set of activities and programs that could be undertaken at each level to build an infrastructure for long term Peacebuilding.
In our experience we have noted the two major interpretations given to the model. Peacebuilders from the West perceive the model as a point of reference to strengthen their capacity for a more “systematic” and “strategic” response to violent conflict. For them, the model clearly identifies peace actors and their functions as well as possible Peacebuilding activities. From a third world perspective the pyramid itself is a furtherance of a dominant system filtered through the Westphalian nation-state system. It affirms the centralizing nature of the Westphalian nation-state and promotes individualism [not individuality!], breaking down the collective identity of a people. It lends credence to a system that suppresses people’s aspirations through a monopolizing centralized authority backed by a rigid bureaucracy controlled by a few.
We wish to interrogate the cardinal points of analysis in this paradigm. First, Lederach’s model seems to define the thesis as a “deeply divided” nation-state. It therefore prescribes an anti-thesis of a “middle-out” multi-level approach in Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding. The synthesis, it seems, is peaceful nation-states. Second, the model is not clear on the criteria of categorizing “leadership in population,” though it echoes a Marxist analysis of society. In most indigenous societies a pyramidal categorization would not accurately represent the structure, power relations or leadership or the ontological worldview of the nation. There are many societies where power and leadership are devolved.
Third, and equally important, is that Lederach’s model omits two critical components – the global forces and poverty. Any model that only glances at the question of globalism and the squalor in the third and fourth worlds must, ipso facto, remain questionable. The poverty and violent conflicts we endure germinate from the alliance of greed involving a few powerful people in Western capitals who connive with political leaders in third and fourth worlds.
Fourth, while Lederach acknowledges that “at issue in many of today’s conflicts is the very nature of existing states, as contested by disputing internal groups,” the model he develops gives scant attention to the critique of the structures of the State. In other words, he seems to make a critique of the functions of state from a statist perspective. On this account, the model makes the same mistake like statist diplomacy, of which Lederach is critical of, and for which he seeks to provide an alternative.
It would seem that Lederach’s analysis and prescriptions assume that peace can effectively be built within the nation-state system if all levels of society are involved in an inclusive process. However, if the foundation of the house is weak, does it matter how inclusive we are, and at what level, we are involved in the building? Shouldn’t the building of the house of peace fundamentally involve the deep digging of the foundation to take into account the elements of globalism, power and poverty that keep sneaking through the foundation?
To be fair to our professor, the model is developed from his experiences working within fragile nation-states. He may have failed to notice that the model would only buttress, or used to justify the need for, a centralized authoritarian system which hardly answers to the aspirations of the many competing for space within it. Lederach proposes a “middle out” approach in intervention. Experience tells us that this kind of approach does not lead to any meaningful transformation of oppressive and violent structures. At best, if Peacebuilding is midwifed along the model, then all we shall have is a smaller pyramid inside the larger pyramid.
The Philippines experience is a good example. Successive revolts by the civil society have only succeeded in replacing the people at the top of the pyramid without making any radical changes to the existing oppressive pyramid. This clearly indicates that transformation of individuals is less than adequate in the quest for justpeace. Peacebuilding without transformation of structures can only lead us to “hot peace.”
Many times, the question that then emerges is: are the middle actors -- or most of whom work with NGOs – usually part of the solution or part of the problem? This becomes even more apparent considering that most NGOs do not witness or live with the consequences of their actions and decisions. Many intermediaries do not run the same risks as the people they work with. More importantly, because of a “lack of tenure” NGO Peacebuilders are more involved in survival needs in the same measure with the grassroots that they seek to help. Sociologists forewarned that this sector of society is never really interested in radical social change. Foremost, they are interested in ascending the rungs of the societal ladder. The NGO workers tend to be more liberal and moderate than the suffering masses. Being able to satisfy their basic needs in the short-term, their concept of justice is in perpetual metamorphosis. As they flirt with the structures they initially intended to oppose, they begin seeing justice issues primarily in terms of human relationships and not justice as including how humans relate with structures and systems. We therefore have a group of people working within unstable systems, with weak and unstable links with the donor community but who are expected to be the critical elements in the building of sustainable peace.
Having “objectivized” their oppressors, the middle class aspires not to change their fragile systems but make the most out of it, survive within it. Or better still; hope that things will change and that they will ascend to the higher rung of the ruling elite. On the other hand, the ruling elite holds this class in fear and suspicion and is, therefore, always on the look out for a few “radicals” in the middle -- who may stir up the masses -- to co-opt them in the higher class or eliminate them altogether. It is doubtful that these are the people we can rely on to devise and co-ordinate value-driven conflict resolution programs. These are the people who will very likely tell you that globalism is inevitable and modern. For most struggling peoples the thesis would be a unipolar hegemonic system nourished by fragile nation-states and intent on dominating the “third world” materially, culturally and ideologically through a profit-driven culture of power.
Babu and Aküm have both completed their post graduation studies in Conflict Transformation
