Beyond the Indo-Naga Ceasefire
The stand off between the security forces (Assam Rifles) and the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (NSCN-IM) over the last few days is not surprising if one can recall similar tension between the two in the past as well. However to the good sense of all concerned parties, the ceasefire and the all important peace process has always survived the rough and tumble of the ground reality arising out of conflicting interest, misinterpretation, misconception and distrust. A few years ago, a similar stand-off was witnessed at Shirui, Ukhrul District in Manipur, lasting for a few weeks, which indeed tested the patience and goodwill of both the parties—the NSCN and Assam Rifles. Perhaps better communication between the two sides besides mutual respect for each others position can resolve whatever ‘misunderstanding’ there is because at the end of the day the credibility of the ceasefire agreement and the Indo-Naga peace process is much more important than scoring some brownie point over each other. Without going into the specifics of what has transpired so far between the NSCN and Assam Rifles, no one party should do anything that goes against the letter and spirit of the Ceasefire Ground Rules (CFGR). The Chairman of the Ceasefire Monitoring Group (CFMG) must ensure that nothing is done by the concerned parties which will endanger the ceasefire.
Obviously one of the problems has always been the interpretation of the CFGR. There appears to be some grey areas, which perhaps the NSCN and the Government of India can take up at a higher level so that ambiguity does not remain. Then the other important task that needs to be addressed is on those who manage and implement the CFGR on the ground—whether both parties have capable and trustworthy people who can adhere to the letter and spirit of the ceasefire. This is important and the right people must be given the onerous responsibility of managing the ceasefire. A person must be able to educate oneself on not just the ceasefire agreement but on the broader subject of the Indo-Naga peace process, study the fine print of the CFGR, observe and apply reason to tackle any situation without endangering peace and trust. Some of the Captains or Majors representing the Assam Rifles appear to have come in recent times on deputation and assignments. Perhaps they should be educated and made aware about the fifteen years of ceasefire, the decade’s long-countless rounds of peace talks taking place at the highest level of the Government of India and the context of the Indo-Naga political process. Whatever may have been the dispute and tension arising over the CFGRs, the practice should always be to give precedence to: reasoning over force. This same spirit must be maintained no matter the provocation. The fifteen years of investing in the peace process is too important a life to be hanged because of one or two incident.
However, having said all this, the question that perhaps we need to ask ourselves (both Delhi and the NSCN) is whether it is high time for both entities to now look beyond the ceasefire and its machinations. In fact, rather then getting into regular tussles over some CFGRs, isn’t it time for both sides to implement some Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). And isn’t it a fact that after countless of periodic extension of the ceasefire, a fresh dimension had been added to the peace process by making the ceasefire ‘indefinite’. Add to this, if at all, a political settlement is near, as both Delhi and the NSCN is claiming, then perhaps they should be doing more important things then wrangling over who is right or wrong. All this also proves that despite the acknowledgement of the unique history and situation of the Nagas by the political establishment in Delhi cutting across party lines, there has always been a third force—the security establishment, obviously under the Ministry of Home Affairs, which has held sway one way or the other to put a spoke in the wheels of the Naga peace process. The fault also lies with the lack of political will demonstrated by the civilian government in Delhi. A political issue must be decided upon by the duly elected government not by people who are not accountable to anybody. Lastly, the time may be ripe for bringing the Indo-Naga talks under the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) because the dialogue process has reached a stage where confidence must be build. And obviously a political settlement cannot be offered through the Ministry of Home Affairs—it must rest with the PMO.
