Ngaranmi Shimray
New Delhi
A persistent question continues to trouble Manipur: why did ordinary citizens, civil society organisations, and armed civilian groups from the Meitei and Zo (Chin–Kuki–Mizo) tribal communities take law into their own hands during the ethnic violence? Unlike the Naga and Kuki tribes, there was no historical enmity between them. The State government’s official narrative frames the conflict mainly as a reaction of these tribes to its campaign against illegal drug trafficking, poppy cultivation, and illegal migrant settlements. If that is true, the enforcement of laws should have been the responsibility of the state administration, not civilians resorting to street vigilantism—burning homes, destroying property, looting arms, and engaging in retaliatory violence.
The scale, coordination, and intensity of violence committed by vigilantes on both sides suggest something much deeper and more entrenched than a spontaneous breakdown of law and order.
The Trigger and the Fault Lines
The violence began on 3 May 2023, with the Tribal Students’ Solidarity March in Churachandpur, organised to protest the Manipur High Court’s order recommending Scheduled Tribe (ST) status for the Meitei community. The march ended peacefully in the hill areas, but not in Churachandpur. Allegations of provocation followed, leading to retaliatory violence that rapidly spread across the State wherever Meitei and Zo communities lived close together. It appears that, against the backdrop of allegations of poppy cultivation, drug trafficking, settlement of illegal migrants, and eviction from protected forests in Churachandpur, these communities felt targeted by the Meitei-dominated state government. The Manipur High Court Order recommending ST status for the Meitei community provided the spark that ignited lingering frustrations. Notably, this district—always represented by a minister—was not given a place in the cabinet under both NDA administrations.
Having secured a favourable order from the Manipur High Court, the Meitei community widely believed they would now be granted ST status, viewing opposition to the court’s decision as an affront to Meitei supremacy. It is important to note that the High Court’s order was challenged in the Supreme Court, which made critical observations about the order exceeding its jurisdiction. However, modifications came too late, and irreparable damage was already done, as evidenced by the violence following 3 May 2023. Arms were looted, and armed civilians from both sides engaged in clashes. Many weapons are still missing and in the hands of radicalised elements.
Land, Poppy, and Perceptions of Selective Enforcement
What is perplexing is the selective nature of the violence—targeting the Zo (Chin–Kuki–Mizo) tribes while deliberately avoiding other tribal groups. This targeting suggests deep-seated frictions and simmering resentments. Additionally, there seems to be a degree of premeditation by two communities, predating the High Court order. These latent tensions appear to be most concentrated along the valley fringes and foothills of Kangpokpi district, as well as in Churachandpur and Moreh towns, where land use, settlement patterns, and economic activity intersect.
Several unresolved issues converge here. Was the friction driven by disputes over land ownership on hill slopes? Did the visible economic gains from poppy cultivation—real or perceived—generate resentment, moral outrage, or a sense of injustice? Did the Court’s order serve as the spark that ignited the conflict?
Poppy cultivation remains an undeniable reality. Even as late as December 2025, poppy fields are visible along the Mahadev–Tallui Road in areas inhabited by Kuki tribes. Cultivation in such plain sight raises serious questions: how is this possible—even under President’s Rule? Do these lands lack owners, village chiefs, or authorities who can be held accountable for illegal poppy cultivation? Are there no laws making such cultivation illegal, with penalties for landowners or village authorities? Amend the Village Authority Act to assign responsibility specifically; require village authorities to report such cultivation to the district or police authorities; and establish a system for the Deputy Commissioner to collect reports and hold officials accountable.
The law does not permit ignorance as a defence. Yet, accountability for poppy farmers and law enforcement agencies remains absent, fueling public suspicion that state machinery is compromised or selectively blind, thus corrupt. While poppy cultivation cannot be justified, it is also the state’s responsibility to promote sustainable alternative livelihoods instead of relying solely on coercive enforcement.
Evictions, Land Laws, and Alienation
The swift demolition and forceful eviction of settlements in the protected forests of Churachandpur deeply alienated the Zo community. Although legality might have been asserted, the manner of execution—sudden, forceful, and poorly communicated—deepened community resentments.
Further complications arose from the problematic extension of the Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms (MLR&LR) Act to Churachandpur and Moreh, without adequately bonding the communities involved. Under Article 371-C and the Presidential Order of 20 June 1972, land laws could have been created by the Hill Areas Committee in partnership with the state government, but the dominant political leadership refused to consider separate laws for hill areas, instead championing extension of the MLR&LR Act. The absence of laws that respect the social, cultural, and traditional practices of tribes exposes vulnerabilities in inter-community relations. The dominance of the Meitei in all spheres of life has fostered resentment and insecurity among tribal communities. Unfortunately, Meitei settlements in hill areas, where land law was extended, have become targets of reprisal. The lack of legal and social cohesion affects the entire state, with Meiteis living in the valley and tribes in the hills. The tribes’ insecurity could have been alleviated if the dominant community had facilitated the creation of different laws for hill areas—an approach consistent with Article 371-C and the 1972 Presidential Order.
A harmonious relationship between different groups—each with its own sets of laws concerning social, cultural, and traditional practices—could have helped Manipur, as seen in northeastern states like Assam (with Bodo, Karbi, and Dima Hasao), Tripura (with Tripuri tribes), and Mizoram (with Chakma, Lai, and Mara). The reluctance of the dominant Meitei community to accept separate laws for the hill tribes may have significantly contributed to the ongoing conflict.
The High Court Order as Catalyst and Erosion of State Neutrality
The Manipur High Court’s order recommending ST status for the Meiteis—issued with the consent of petitioners and respondents but notably without comments from the respondents (state and Central governments)—shocked tribal communities and revealed a Meitei-centric bias. No tribal organisation was made a respondent. This raises questions: Is the Manipur state government only for the Meiteis? Do minority communities lack a voice in policymaking that affects them?
The procedural handling of this sensitive issue heightened suspicions of interference by influential actors. The oral order, issued on 27 March 2023, was uploaded only on 19 April 2023. This delay, combined with the absence of tribal respondents and the lack of government reply, fostered perceptions of opacity and exclusion, reinforcing the idea that the Manipur government prioritises Meitei interests. For tribal people, the order felt sudden, exclusionary, and an affront to constitutional protections. This perceived bias blurred the lines between the government and the dominant community, casting doubts on many administrative actions.
The rise of pseudo-socio-cultural organisations such as Arambai Tenggol and Meitei Leepun, believed to have political backing, further deepened distrust. The lack of resistance by local police during incidents of arms looting raises disturbing questions about tacit collusion or abdication of responsibility. The environment of bias has also intimidated tribal leaders. Moderation, dialogue, and restraint became politically costly. The failure of leadership—across communities—to promote compromise and restraint has proven disastrous.
Why People Resort to Vigilantism
People take the law into their own hands mainly when they perceive that justice and protection are absent. Vigilantism is driven by: a lack of immediate state protection, deep distrust of police and courts, desire for control and revenge, frustration with slow or biased justice, and perceived inadequacy of punishment. Although emotionally understandable, vigilantism undermines the rule of law, breeds chaos, harms innocent people, and perpetuates cycles of violence. This is why societies delegate coercive authority solely to the state.
A Fragile Truce, Not Peace
Today, even under President’s Rule, Manipur is not truly at peace. It is only experiencing a temporary lull. Internally displaced persons cannot return home, the Zo tribes remain banished from Imphal, and grievances largely remain unaddressed after nearly three years. This fragile calm could vanish if a government is formed without a genuine political settlement or credible peace process. Discontented parties might conclude that moderation and restraint do not pay, leading to renewed violence.
A political solution is essential. The key lies with those who control the state. While the Zo tribes have demanded separate administration, establishing a constitutionally empowered Autonomous District or Territorial Council, or even a full-fledged state for the hill areas—including the Nagas—could be considered, potentially with future consolidation as permitted under Articles 3 and 4. The reluctance of Zo groups to engage in government formation stems from this unresolved political issue. The leadership vacuum in Manipur is evident, with no leader showing the capacity to restore trust or demonstrate the statesmanship needed to restore normalcy. If a political settlement cannot be achieved under the neutrality of President’s Rule, then a popularly elected government, constrained by political considerations, is unlikely to deliver what President's Rule has failed to do.
The risk of Manipur slipping back into lawlessness is higher under a weak government. Even under President's Rule, armed groups have taken on roles similar to the state, destroying poppy crops in villages like K. Songlung. Such acts of vigilante direct actions could trigger larger conflicts. Radicalised civil society organisations and armed socio-cultural groups involved in violence after 3 May 2023 have not been held accountable. With many arms still missing, they could regroup and reignite violence, destabilising the state, especially if law enforcement remains weak and no political settlement is reached. Having a strong, credible government is crucial, but its absence could be disastrous.
Dialogue Must Begin
Dialogue is the only way forward. If peaceful coexistence is the goal, the state must act as a genuinely neutral arbiter, not a partisan actor. A durable political settlement should be pursued under President’s Rule, not through quick-fix solutions driven by political expediency.
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