Dr. Joseph Kuba
The Armed Forces Special Powers Act 1958 (AFSPA) is almost as old as India’s own independence since it was made to become an integral part of the state-building exercise in post-independent India particularly in the Northeast states. It was this role that made any activity under the AFSPA ‘strategic’ and secretive. People found it extremely difficult to delve deep into the operationalisation and other nitty gritty and any complaint/challenge in this regard could easily be frustrated by Articles 4 & 6 of the Act. Recently, however, as seen in Jammu and Kashmir, the government appears to be admitting that repeal or amendment of the Act can actually bring down the scale of violence and that one of the main solutions for the unrest could be to completely do away with the Act and remove the armed personnel stationed there. While popular opinion has been in favour of such a move by the government, the Armed Forces have consistently opposed the repeal of the Act and they have in all cases had the major say. What seems to be the reason for this attitude when there are many takers that this piece of legislation is fundamentally flawed both in theory and practice?
Following are some pointers to attempt at reasoning why the Armed Forces would be happy with the status quo and try their best to maintain it so. Any military strategy is operationalised under certain basic underlying principles. The Military Doctrine as formulated from time to time is the key document under which all strategy and tactics find its rationale. This document clearly specifies threats, its different manifestations, specific measures/strategies to respond to them, overall assessment in terms of manpower and equipment available and the nature of expertise needed.
The Indian military establishment has self-confessed that it has no doctrine. Therefore, the problem encountered here becomes one of simply facing the threats in an uncontrolled manner. It is difficult to understand who the real enemy is, what the sources of conflict are and which strategies to apply to counter the threats. Confusion is added because the security contours dividing internal and external security are also not clearly defined. It is conventional wisdom that external security threats are the prerogative of the Army while the police take care of internal security threats. In the case of India, both the forces are used as per requirement without taking into consideration the nature of training, expertise, the stock of firepower available and so on. Eric Hobsbawm writes that “the key to India’s failure in combating insurgency is an ahistorical, one-size-fits-all security doctrine.” This free-for-all pattern of managing security has advantaged the military because events, activities, etc. can be easily manipulated to suit the selfish ends of certain unscrupulous individuals. Often what happens in the field and the final report to the authorities are two completely different versions.
The long years of implementation of the AFSPA in the dubbed ‘disturbed areas’ has created a situation where the Act has become some sort of an institution by itself with major stakeholders, planned programmes, increased inflow of funds and the growth of highly influential pressure groups. The Act has been continuously extended 104 times and the logic now is that as long as there is conflict the AFSPA will continue. This particular legislation has taken hostage of all the other law and order maintenance strategies because of the extent of leverage and power it gives to the key players.
The amount of power it provides can easily be figured out from something as simple as the manner in which a low-ranked officer (let’s say Captain) is provided almost a dozen security guards whenever he travels. All the traffic has to slow down and give way to allow these ‘big-shots’ to pass. While the threat to an officer’s life is real, such treatment gives the officer the feel of ‘power’ resulting in arrogance, insolence and often behaviour nor commensurating with that of an officer. A one-star general in a place like Delhi travels in a single car with perhaps one personal bodyguard.
Counter-insurgency operations offer the biggest opportunities for a military officer for decorations and career enhancements. Many of the ‘acts of bravery’ are often at the expense of civilians and innocent people who happen to be at the wrong place at the wrong time. Deaths of non-combatants are easily passed off as one caught in crossfire or are further victimized as an ex-rebel, a new recruit, or one who has rejoined the group, an over-ground informer, a sympathizer or someone who assists in logistics. Subsequently, the perpetrator is flaunted as a hero and medals and commendations follow.
The so-called ‘encounters’ are another convenient form of legitimizing the death of innocents on the one hand and career-push for Army personnel involved on the other. Logically arguing, no two armed groups can suddenly spring from no-where to engage in an encounter. Either side is sure to be aware of the presence of the other. The appropriate term here would be ‘ambush’. In an ambush, the attackers are at a big advantage and the attacked usually suffers the maximum damage. Contrarily, reports in the media give the Armed Forces the advantage whether they are being ambushed or they plant the ambush. As such, questions arise as to whether encounters do really happen as reported. As a critic of the term and going by what sometimes the persons engaged in such ‘encounters’ say, these cases are more than often plain murders when an insurgent/sympathizer or one suspected of being such is caught off-guard and attempts to flee. The person is killed with little attempt at a capture. Dubbed as a rebel, the report will show recovery of a number of incriminating paraphernalia from the dead person. If actually nothing is found on the person certain objects will be secretly planted and the killing is justified. Another hero is born.
AFSPA has increased the inflow of money for the Armed Forces to be better prepared and equipped to tackle violence. Violence also attracts appeasement strategies which often come in the form of financial incentives and funding of various programmes in the name of expanding the avenues for building peace. But loose monitoring can only lead to these appeasement funds consciously being used to increase violence so that more of such funding comes in. Recently, a lot of money is being poured into what is commonly known as the Military Civic Activities (MCA). Small projects are being carried out vigorously by the Military in various fields. Amounts used here and there may be small but put together it is substantial. More money means more opportunities for financial misappropriation.
Now to answer the question why is the Military against the Scrapping or Dilution of the AFSPA?
First, as mentioned, in the absence of a ‘Military Doctrine’ which clearly defines the over-all strategic scenario of the country and in the face of mounting threats, AFSPA gives the security managers all the necessary acquiescence in a free-for-all manner for an all out offensive against threats which are mostly defined contextually. With no real worry of accountability the Act gives immense powers to the Armed Forces.
Secondly, this power can be easily manipulated to the advantage of the personnel of the Armed Forces. Many have enhanced their career through the AFSPA. Some unscrupulous persons even go to the extent of consciously indulging in activities including murder, looting, rape, etc. to get medals. This was clearly made evident during Operation Blue Bird. The Act has been notorious for making heroes out of criminals.
Thirdly, the AFSPA has also been instrumental in making many Army personnel rich. Smuggling of IMFL, petrol, diesel, medicines and other such supplies, manipulation of finances meant for maintenance of camps, renovation works, repair of vehicles and social welfare under such projects as the MCA, etc. have all been taking place.
Fourthly, the AFSPA in the course of its long existence has garnered for itself a powerful set of ‘pressure groups’ including, among others, the Intelligence, the Bureaucracy along with the Military. This enclave can dictate terms even to the government in the backdrop of increasing acts of ‘terror’. No government is going to risk the act of having revoked the AFSPA when the ‘general’ opinion is that terrorism in India is synonymous with ‘breaking India into pieces’.
The NE and the J&K region is of immense strategic value to India. Without any doubt, India’s security concerns must incorporate these two at the highest level. The argument, however, that with AFSPA as the most potent weapon, security threats in these regions can be drastically brought under control does not seem to hold much water. The Act has outlived its utility and today this legislation is useful only for the decoration of more fraudulent Military personnel, the production of more generals, making many officers rich beyond their capabilities and for a time giving the Armed Forces powers beyond their wildest imaginations.
