Farce follows tragedy in Myanmar

If Karl Marx was right that history repeats itself first as tragedy and then as farce, Myanmar may have just entered the farcical phase of its long-running military rule. The first general election held in over 20 years last November and announcement that a new elected National Assembly will be convened on January 31 have not excited many ordinary Myanmar citizens, but have led to wild speculation among foreign pundits about what it all means for the country's political future.
Many seem to have forgotten that a similar "transition" to "civilian rule" occurred in 1974, following a rigged referendum on a new constitution in 1973. The then ruling junta, the Revolutionary Council, gave way to the military-controlled Burma Socialist Program Party, which formed a government made up of retired army officers. The transition in retrospect was a tragedy as it solidified the one-party system that Myanmar, then known as Burma, already had in place and precipitated economic decline in what was previously one of Southeast Asia's most prosperous countries.
The 1974 constitution guaranteed the military's grip on power and made its original 1962 military putsch legal. That military-dominated political arrangement lasted until a nationwide uprising for democracy erupted in 1988, which the military crushed through lethal force and in the aftermath reintroduced direct military rule through the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) junta. The SLORC later changed the country's name from Burma to Myanmar and rebranded itself as the State Peace and Development Council in 1997.
Now under a new constitution that was adopted after a similarly well-orchestrated referendum in 2008, more than one political party is officially allowed in Myanmar. But the dominance of the military's new Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) proxy, which swept over 80% of the seats in last November's rigged polls, is complete. The new charter also reserves 25% of the National Assembly's seats for the military.
The military is nonetheless taking no chances. On the campaign trail and after the election, candidates and MPs elect have had their freedom of speech severely restricted. Any speech deemed by authorities as a threat to "national security, the unity of the country and the constitution" threaten to land the speaker in prison for up to two years.
In late December, the state-run daily New Light of Myanmar newspaper spelled out the military's intentions more clearly: the opposition should stop calling for "national reconciliation" and instead support the government to achieve "national reconsolidation". "Indirect and direct approaches designed to control the ruling government will never come to fruition," the paper stated.
Despite these restrictions, some foreign analysts are holding out hope for democratic change. Derek Tonkin, a former British ambassador to Thailand, suggested farcically in his newsletter that "the elections, flawed as they are, could provide a catalyst." For exactly what, however, the former envoy did not make clear.
Priscilla Clapp, a senior American analyst and former Yangon-based US diplomat, seems convinced that an army reshuffle a few months before the election, in which more than 70 senior and many more junior officers retired to have the constitutional right to "contest" the polls will pave the way for a new, presumably more reform-minded, generation of army officers. And with new "civilians" in government, she suggests, change is in the air.
Whether military officers were in or out of uniform made no difference in 1974 - and is even less likely to do so today considering the military's ironclad grip on power. Nor will a few muted opposition voices in the National Assembly be of any democratic significance. In the old, pre-1988 National Assembly, the official media routinely reported that delegates always "discussed in support of proposals" submitted by the real military rulers of the country.
If any of the handful of non-USDP assemblymen dare to challenge military orders, the authorities have constitutional means to deal with such dissent, including through legal military takeovers. In case of a "national emergency", clause 413 of the new charter gives the president the right to hand executive as well as judicial power to the commander-in-chief of the defense services, who "may exercise the said powers and duties himself or empower on any suitable military authority" to do the job for him.
The new National Assembly will consist of an Upper House with 168 elected seats and 56 reserved for the military, and a Lower House with 330 elected and 110 military seats. With solid majorities of 129 seats in the Upper House and 259 in the Lower House that the USDP achieved through the rigged November elections, plus the 25% of seats reserved for the military, the new system will ensure in a new legal way the continuation of the old military-ruled order.
Negligent neighbors
Myanmar's partners in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have hailed the election as progress and called on Western nations, including the US, to drop their economic and financial sanctions. At an ASEAN meeting on the Indonesian island of Lombok on January 17, the host country's foreign minister Marty Natalegawa described the elections as "conducive and transparent" and said that the 10-member bloc would like to see "the immediate or early removal or easing of sanctions that have been applied against Myanmar by some countries."
Many ASEAN countries have vested economic interests in Myanmar and through economic engagement policies have over the years undermined the West's sanctions regime.
Meanwhile, there is little indication that Myanmar's military leadership is in much of a democratic mood. At a passing out parade at the Defense Services Technological Academy on December 17, military chief General Than Shwe told the graduates that "you can confront anything and win if you avoid the opponents' strong points, exploit their shortcomings and strike at their weaknesses."
The military rank and file has clearly taken that advice to heart. The opposition's strong point is pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi, who was detained and barred from participating in the election and released a week after the polls. The weakness of the opposition was its lack of unity: Suu Kyi's party, the National League for Democracy, split in half over whether or not it should take part in the election.
Those who favored participation probably now regret it; the new National Democratic Front, set up by former NLD members, won a paltry 16 seats in both houses. Predictably, NDF candidates competed on an unequal playing field. According to several eyewitness reports in several constituencies in Yangon and elsewhere, where a candidate other than the one from the USDP appeared to be winning, boxes of "advance votes" were brought in to prevent such a result. In other places where the USDP seemed to be faring poorly, the vote counting was conducted in secret.
Opinion is also divided in countries traditionally critical of Myanmar's rights-abusing regime. In the US, Virginia Senator Jim Webb, once one of Myanmar's staunchest critics, has flip-flopped to become a staunch advocate of lifting sanctions and engaging the regime. In the European Union, several countries are already doing business with Myanmar despite the sanctions. In its December 14 edition, The Myanmar Times quoted Myint Soe from the Union of Myanmar Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry as saying: "Among the European nations, Germany is one of our largest trading partners, even considering the sanctions." And sanctions do not cover pre-existing investments in the lucrative oil and gas industry, where France's Total is a major investor.
Voices are now being heard in other EU countries, especially among thei r Bangkok-based envoys, advocating for engagement with the regime based on perceptions that decades of sanctions have failed to achieve democratic change. This argument, or course, fails to take into account that other countries' engagement policies have similarly failed to achieve positive political change.
ASEAN has long engaged Myanmar through trade and investment initiatives. However, in a confidential US diplomatic cable made public by WikiLeaks in December, Singapore's senior statesman Lee Kuan Yew described Myanmar's generals as "stupid" and "difficult to deal with". Dealing with the regime, Lee said, was like "talking to dead people" - a damning assessment of ASEAN's "constructive engagement" policy from one of the region's most business-minded leaders.
Viewed in this light, Myanmar's initial tragedy of 1974 has turned into the farce of 2010. In effect, the old repressive one-party system has been reintroduced in everything but name. As the new rules guarantee, a few opposition voices will make little difference under the new military dominated dispensation. Even authoritarian-run China and North Korea are formally multi-party states under the leadership of their de facto ruling communists - China has eight parties other than the dominant Communist Party while North Korea allows for three. Such comparisons are more apt than hopeful speculation that Myanmar's elections and new parliament represent genuine democratic change.
Bertil Lintner is a former correspondent with the Far Eastern Economic Review and the author of several books on Myanmar. He is currently a writer with Asia Pacific Media Services.