How Popular Mandates Can Undermine the Institutions That Make Democracy Possible
Besesayo Kezo, IPS, Retd DGP
Democracy is often celebrated as the least bad form of government, yet its history is littered with moments when the very tools of popular sovereignty were turned against the system itself. Under certain conditions, the promise of rule by the people can become a pathway to rule by a faction, a personality, or a mob. When elections become the sole criterion of legitimacy and people treat constitutional guardrails as obstacles rather than protections, democracy risks becoming a shell—retaining the form of popular choice while hollowing out the substance of limited, accountable government. This is the peril of fake democracy.
What Democracy Is, and Why Guardrails Are Essential
At its core, modern liberal democracy rests on two principles: popular sovereignty and the protection of individual rights through limited government. Citizens elect their representatives in free and fair elections. Those representatives govern under a constitution that distributes power, guarantees basic liberties, and subjects rulers to the rule of law. Elections alone do not constitute democracy. Without independent courts, a free press, opposition parties able to contest power without fear, and a bureaucracy that does not serve as the ruling party's private instrument, the vote becomes a periodic ratification of power rather than a check on it.
The essential guardrails are therefore institutional, not merely procedural. Separation of powers prevents the concentration of legislative, executive, and judicial authority in a single set of hands. An independent judiciary interprets the Constitution and can strike down overreach. A free press and a robust civil society scrutinise government and inform citizens. Minority rights and federal arrangements protect groups that may never command a permanent majority. These mechanisms exist precisely because majorities can be wrong, transient, or manipulated. They are not anti-democratic; they are the conditions that allow democracy to endure beyond a single electoral cycle.
When the Promises of Democracy Become Instruments of Abuse
Democracy’s most attractive promises—equality of political voice, responsiveness to the people’s will, and the removal of hereditary or oligarchic privilege—can be weaponised. A leader who claims to embody “the real people” against “elites,” “outsiders,” or “anti-nationals” can use temporary popularity as a pretext to dismantle the institutions that constrain government. This rhetoric of majority rule then allows one faction to entrench itself permanently. Once the opposition is delegitimised as unpatriotic or corrupt, the press is portrayed as the enemy of the people, and courts are accused of obstructing the popular will, the path to capturing those institutions opens.
Popularity without institutional restraint is not self-correcting. Merit in governance—competence, honesty, respect for the law—can be subordinated to loyalty and spectacle. When voters reward identity, grievance, or charismatic performance over records of institutional stewardship, politics' incentive structure shifts. Power is pursued for its own sake, and the means of democracy (elections, public communication, legislative majorities) are used to disable the checks that prevent its abuse. Leaders evade responsibility by claiming that any criticism of the leader is criticism of the people themselves.
Historical Examples: From Hitler to Contemporary Debates
The classic cautionary tale remains the Weimar Republic. Adolf Hitler did not seize power by coup in 1933; he was appointed Chancellor after his party won a plurality in free elections. He then used emergency powers, street violence, and the Reichstag fire to dismantle the constitution from within. Within months, other parties were banned, the press was brought under control, and the rule of law was replaced by the Führerprinzip. The lesson is not that elections are dangerous, but that elections in a society where institutions are already weak, where large sections of the elite and public have lost faith in liberal norms, and where economic crisis fuels extremism can be the final step towards dictatorship.
Contemporary discussions often cite Donald Trump in the United States and Narendra Modi in India. Both leaders won clear electoral mandates—Trump in 2016 and again in 2024, and Modi in 2014, 2019, and 2024. Supporters argue that their victories reflect democratic accountability against entrenched establishments and that accusations of authoritarianism are partisan. Critics contend that both have tested institutional boundaries: Trump through sustained challenges to the legitimacy of the 2020 election and rhetoric that questioned the neutrality of the Justice Department, intelligence agencies, and the military; Modi through the concentration of power in the Prime Minister’s Office, the use of investigative agencies against political opponents, pressure on independent media, and changes to the status of institutions that previously operated with greater autonomy.
These cases are not comparable to 1930s Germany. Both the United States and India retain competitive elections, opposition parties that win state and local contests, and courts that continue to issue rulings adverse to the government. The relevant question is whether repeated efforts to staff institutions with loyalists, to treat criticism as disloyalty, and to redefine the boundaries of acceptable opposition are eroding the informal norms that sustain formal constitutional rules. History suggests the slide is rarely sudden; it usually happens incrementally, with each step justified by the urgency of the moment or the wickedness of opponents.
From Popularity Without Merit to Majoritarian Tyranny
When electoral success becomes the sole source of legitimacy, other forms of political judgement—expertise, constitutional fidelity, and the long-term public interest—lose standing. A leader with strong personal popularity can override institutional advice, replace independent officials with loyalists, and dismiss any resistance as elite obstruction of the people’s will. Over time, this produces majoritarianism in the pejorative sense: not the normal operation of majority rule within constitutional limits, but the claim that the majority (or the leader who speaks for it) may do anything the constitution does not explicitly forbid and may reinterpret the constitution to remove remaining limits.
The next stage is the shift from majoritarianism to mobocracy. Street pressure, social media campaigns, and organised outrage intimidate judges, journalists, and civil servants. Anarchy is not the absence of order but the replacement of lawful order with the will of those who can mobilise force or noise. At that stage, the original democratic mechanisms have been hollowed out. Elections may continue, but outcomes are managed by controlling the media environment, selectively enforcing the law, and co-opting or neutralising opposition. Power is captured without corresponding responsibility because accountability mechanisms have been disabled in the people's name.
The United States and India: On the Verge?
Neither the United States nor India has crossed the threshold into open tyranny. Both remain electoral democracies with substantial opposition, independent (if pressured) judiciaries, and civil societies capable of protest. Claims that either is “on the verge” of becoming a tyranny must be weighed against these facts. At the same time, both societies have faced serious strains. In the United States, persistent election denialism among significant segments of one major party, combined with efforts to assert greater executive control over the administrative state, has raised concerns about the durability of peaceful transfers of power and the neutrality of the administration. In India, the increasing centralisation of authority, a growing number of criminal cases against opposition leaders, and shrinking space for independent reporting on sensitive issues have prompted warnings from domestic and international observers about democratic backsliding.
The common pattern is not the outright abolition of elections but the distortion of constitutional bodies so they function primarily as instruments of the incumbent. Election commissions, investigative agencies, and regulatory bodies can be staffed or influenced to create asymmetric advantages. When such practices become normalised, the distinction between a government that wins elections and one that uses state power to keep winning them blurs. The danger is not that leaders will cancel the next election, but that they will hold it under conditions that prevent the opposition from competing on equal terms.
The Role of Democrats and Citizens
The primary defence against fake democracy is not a particular party or leader but the habits and institutions of a democratic society. Citizens who treat elections as the end of political responsibility rather than its beginning contribute to the problem. Civic education that emphasises constitutional limits, the value of disagreement, and the distinction between government and the nation is essential. Opposition parties must retain the capacity to offer credible alternatives and to defend institutional norms, even when doing so is electorally costly. Civil servants, judges, and journalists who refuse to become instruments of any party perform a difficult-to-replace public service.
Both the United States and India offer examples of resistance. State governments, courts, and local media have at times checked national majorities. Peaceful protest and subnational electoral competition show that power remains contestable. The question is whether these counterweights can be sustained when the central government controls significant resources and narrative power. Citizens who continue to demand evidence, support independent institutions even when those institutions frustrate their preferred policies, and reject equating political disagreement with treason practise the only form of patriotism compatible with democracy.
Remedies Prescribed by Political Philosophers
Political thought has long recognised these dangers. Aristotle warned that pure democracy tends towards rule by the poor over the rich and recommended a mixed constitution that balances democratic, oligarchic, and aristocratic elements. In the Federalist Papers, James Madison argued that the extended republic and separation of powers were necessary precisely because factions are inevitable; the aim is not to eliminate the majority but to prevent any majority from capturing all the levers of government at once. Alexis de Tocqueville identified the “tyranny of the majority” as a distinctive democratic pathology and hoped that associations, local self-government, and a culture of liberty could counterbalance the centralising tendencies of democratic equality.
John Stuart Mill insisted that liberty of thought and discussion is not a luxury but a condition for discovering truth and correcting error; a society that silences dissent in the name of the popular will impoverishes itself. Karl Popper’s conception of the open society emphasised the institutional capacity to remove bad rulers without violence—the defining feature of democracy is not that the people rule, but that they can change rulers peacefully. More recent thinkers have stressed the importance of “democratic guardrails” that are both cultural and legal: mutual toleration between opposing parties and institutional forbearance (the willingness not to use every legal power simply because one can).
The practical remedies that follow from this tradition are familiar yet demanding: protect the independence of the judiciary and election administration through transparent appointment processes and fixed terms; maintain a genuinely pluralistic media environment; strengthen federalism and local government so that no single election decides everything; cultivate civic education that teaches the difference between the government of the day and the constitutional order; and accept that political defeat is a normal and necessary feature of democratic life, not an existential crisis. None of these measures can be ensured by law alone. They depend on citizens who value the system more than any particular outcome.
Conclusion
Fake democracy is not the absence of elections. It is elections alongside the systematic weakening of every institution that could meaningfully constrain power. Historical examples, from Weimar Germany to contemporary debates in established democracies, show that popularity can lead to institutional capture when the public and elites alike lose the habit of defending limits. The United States and India are not yet tyrannies, but both face pressures that, in other times and places, have led to irreversible erosion.
The remedies remain those identified by classical and modern political philosophers: constitutional design that disperses power, a culture that tolerates opposition, and citizens who recognise that defending democracy sometimes requires defending the rights of those with whom they disagree.
Without that understanding, democracy's promises can become instruments of its undoing. The choice is not between order and liberty, nor between the people and institutions. It is between a democracy capable of self-correction and a system that preserves only the rituals of popular choice while concentrating unaccountable power.