Aheli Moitra
In November 2000, India, after 44 years of its initial organization, managed to create three new states: Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and Uttarakhand. The history and the course of movements leading up to the formation of each of the states vary, except for one common strand—it was the Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) politics, more through compulsion than commitment, which made the creations possible. In separate strands, the Congress and Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) played their roles too. These histories, it seems, are pertinent to Nagaland today with national political parties interested in a piece of the Naga pie. For the purpose of this editorial though, only Jharkhand’s movement will be highlighted.
The adivasis, tribal people of Central India, were in far deeper trouble than the indigenous people of the North East. Land acquisition for mining was pressing in Bihar, Bengal, Orissa and Madhya Pradesh, and since 1890, the people in today’s Jharkhand rebelled against it. Though the British had in place an act to curtail such large scale acquisition, other Land Acquisition Act(s) made rubbish of the former. In 1928, a call for a sub-state from the Simon Commission for the adivasis had already been sounded, and rejected. When the Jharkhand Party, in 1954, demanded formation of a Jharkhand state from the State Reorganisation Committee (SRC), its demand was rejected on several grounds and a ‘development board’ suggested instead.
Politics of division marked the violent (more than the peasant movements in India) tribal movement. Capital flight became the crux of the protests, especially after nationalization of coal fields in 1972, as outsiders (from North Bihar, Bengal etc.) made more wages from the mines of the region, and replaced the locals for jobs. An alliance of the Jharkhand Party with the Congress proved further damaging as the latter stuck to its hierarchical and dynastic politics. Class and ethnicity, then, played a major role in directing the movement for rights of the adivasi. Though the left provided some ideological depth, the reality of class, ethnicity and indigeneity proved too complex for any one front to address.
By the late 1970s, confusion was profuse. A section of the people’s movement tried to reclaim their right to land by protesting the felling of trees by the government, while another section felled trees to protest rampant poverty and hunger!
Student protests, economic blockades and state violence saw the people of the region through the 1980s and early 90s. In 1994, a crippled Jharkhand Area Autonomous Council (JAAC) was formed with minor legislative and executive powers. Most political fronts seemed to have gone blind.
It is here that the BJP, whose Bihar unit in 1988 had passed a resolution demanding a ‘Vananchal’ state, stepped in. That Jharkhand was referred to by its Sanskrit name reeked of Hindu upper caste involvement, quite in contrast to what it intended to be. Jharkhand, the idea, meant to unite tribal areas from Bihar, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh and West Bengal, was reduced to its Bihar unit alone.
Eventually it would come to mean that not only were the tribal peoples’ movement for rights undermined as they stood divided, but also that BJP cared more for its electoral compulsions than the actual problems facing the people. The new Vananchal proposed no new framework to address rights. All political parties worked in the same way, more for seats than people. The RJD, whose leader Laloo Prasad Yadav had once said ‘Jharkhand over my dead body’, later became keen on Jharkhand as it would leave the party in majority in the new Bihar assembly.
Even then, the post liberalization phase had given rise to severe exploitation of the working class, and neither the Congress, BJP nor their local affiliates could politically afford to ignore the issues. Local movements were strong not just for the formation of a state but around actual issues.
It would be useful for the Nagas to remember here that the formation of Jharkhand, or for that matter Chhattisgarh, had limited effect on the people. Exploitation in both the tribal states has continued. If anything, the new states have clamped down in a whole new manner on its people, speaking more for its industrial masters. This has led to a violent people’s war and further repression.
As more political parties dive into the Naga pool, it is best to go back to what the Naga movement in this region stands for. Bartering rights/demilitarization for ‘national integration’ and electoral politics will only fetch a servile political deal leading to more exploitation and repression.
